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Adam P. Zelizer
This dissertation examines how legislators learn about policy proposals. It focuses
on three common sources of policy information — staff briefings, cues, and group
deliberations — to show the causal effect of information on legislators’ policy posi-
tions. It uses a new approach, field experiments, that allows me to answer questions
about information, institutions, and outcomes that heretofore have been difficult to
study quantitatively. Results from the three studies I conducted are largely consis-
tent with theories of legislating under imperfect information. All three studies find
that information affects position-taking. On average, information increases support
by reducing legislators’ uncertainty. Information is most influential on bills that leg-
islators are ideologically predisposed to support. In some respects, findings extend
or challenge existing theories. Legislators appear responsive to repeated messaging.
Cues and briefings interact to make legislators even more supportive of bills than we
would expect from their separate effects. Cues determine a far greater proportion
of positions than prior studies suggested. Finally, group deliberation appears to re-
duce partisan polarization in bill coalitions. All together, the studies illustrate that
imperfect information constrains position-taking, that legislative staff, cue-taking,
and deliberation can effectively communicate information, and that legislative insti-
tutions influence individual positions by providing policy-relevant information.
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“A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of
government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge
of the means by which that object can be best attained. Some govern-
ments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments are deficient
in the first. I scruple not to assert, that in American governments too
little attention has been paid to the last.” - James Madison, Federalist
62, 1788.
In 1971, Rep. Tom Moore introduced a memorial resolution in the Texas House
of Representatives. The resolution commended “Albert De Salvo [sic] on his out-
standing career of public service.” It noted “He has been officially recognized... for
his noted activities and unconventional techniques involving population control and
applied psychology.” Like most memorials, Rep. Moore’s resolution passed unani-
mously, without debate, through the state house.
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Astute readers will recognize that Mr. DeSalvo’s name was misspelled in the
resolution. They will also wonder why Mr. DeSalvo, better known as the Boston
Strangler, was chosen for an official commendation. Rep. Moore considered the
resolution a prank on his peers, and he tabled it after the vote (Witherspoon 2009).
Nevertheless, many observers took a less sanguine perspective of the whole ordeal.
If legislators could be snookered into commending the Boston Strangler, what other
legislation might they approve simply because they had not done their homework?
Commemorative proposals are largely inconsequential,1 but legislators commonly
complain that they are not granted enough time to study significant legislation. Dur-
ing debate on the Affordable Care Act, then-Rep. Dean Heller complained that he
had insufficient time to read the bill. Republican Minority Leader Mitch McConnell
decried the lack of “full and transparent debate” on the bill (Ferraro and Smith
2009). After a change in government, Democrats raised similar objections to the
2017 tax reform bill. Senator Jon Tester complained that “I was just handed a 479-
page tax bill a few hours before the vote.... This is Washington, D.C. at its worst”
(Tester 2017). Despite their remonstrations, Sen. Tester had previously voted for
the lengthy Affordable Care Act, and Sens. Heller and McConnell would vote for
the hastily drafted tax bill.
Partisan posturing aside, hurried lawmaking does have tangible consequences
for public policy. One does not have to look far for examples of legislation passed
with unpredicted costs or outright errors. The New York Times reported that “The
legislative blitz that rocketed the $1.5 trillion tax cut through Congress in less than
1Congress uses such resolutions to name buildings, issue stamps and coins, and grant Congres-
sional Gold Medals.
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two months created a host of errors and ambiguities in the law that businesses big and
small are just now discovering and scrambling to address” (Tankersley and Rappeport
2018). While it is difficult to know whether lawmakers truly made a mistake or
just chose to ignore these problems, other times it is clear, such as when The Hill
reported that “W.Va. lawmakers try to give teachers smaller raise, accidentally pass
bill giving them full raise” (Seipel 2018). In this case, legislators voted through the
wrong version of a bill. Uninformed lawmaking leads to very real, and sometimes
very large, costs for government and the public.
It is tempting, but wrong, to blame individual legislators for these mistakes. For
some time, it has been recognized that modern policymaking is too complex for any
single individual to understand. In part for this reason, legislatures have adopted
institutions to support policymaking efforts. These institutions include committees,
parties, research bureaus, and staff. When we observe apparently uninformed pol-
icy outcomes, we should ask not how legislators could let that happen, but instead
whether legislative institutions are functioning as they should. The information prob-
lem, as it were, is less about individual competence than collective and institutional
policy expertise.
Imperfect information poses problems not only for policy outcomes and for legisla-
tive organization. It raises difficult questions for political scientists. The conventional
wisdom among the public and much of political science is that policies result from
well-informed bargaining among competing policymakers. Legislative outcomes are
then best understood in terms of which legislators, and which voters, get what they
want. This zero-sum view magnifies conflict, but it could be considered reassuring.
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Policy outcomes are at least predictable and understandable even if they are, in some
cases, biased, unrepresentative, or normatively unappealing.
Despite Madison’s warning over two hundred years ago, political scientists still
pay less attention to the knowledge of policymakers than to their responsiveness to
the public. What if policies are based on a limited, asymmetric, and potentially
incorrect understanding of the policy issue itself? To what extent might the various
problems in contemporary legislatures, such as gridlock and polarization, actually
come down to differences in legislators’ substantive information about policy? We
simply don’t know the answers to these and similar questions regarding the influence
of information on policymaking.
This dissertation examines how legislators learn about policy proposals. It fo-
cuses on three common sources of policy-relevant information: staff briefings, cues
from close peers, and deliberations with groups of legislators. Its main contribution is
to demonstrate the causal effect of policy information on legislators’ policy positions.
It does so using a new approach to the empirical study of legislative procedures: field
experiments. Experiments allow us to answer questions about information, institu-
tions, and outcomes that have heretofore been difficult to study quantitatively. To
understand why, we can look at the development of legislative studies of information
and policymaking.
1.1 Policymaking under incomplete information
Informational issues were first framed in terms of “legislative incompetency” (Rocca
1921). John Stuart Mill criticized the members of Parliament as “inexperience sitting
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in judgment on experience, ignorance on knowledge” (Mill 1865, 93). Lord Bryce
described the “keen, though limited, intelligence” (1906, 65) of American legislators
as being no better, but no worse, than the average voter. Alabama Governor Em-
met O’Neal summed up the prevailing opinion when he stated that “a session of
the Legislature is looked upon as something in the nature of an unavoidable pub-
lic calamity” (O’Neal 1914, 685). These observers and others questioned whether
democratically-elected lawmakers could make good public policy.
Reformers and political scientists during the Progressive and New Deal Eras re-
alized that institutions were the answer to problems of individual ignorance. During
the Progressive Era, American legislatures established the first professional refer-
ence bureaus, bill drafting bureaus, and revision committees. Following the rise of
dominant executive lawmaking during the New Deal, legislatures adopted councils,
expanded staff, and reformed their committee systems (Hyneman 1938; Gaus 1932;
Rhodes 1946; Lederle 1948; Jones 1952; Davey 1953). The academic literature’s
attention to cognitive constraints, imperfect information, and the potential of insti-
tutions to overcome informational problems was ahead of its time.
The literature on these legislative reform movements failed in two respects. First,
enacted reforms were not followed by empirical analyses offering support that the
new rules or institutions actually improved outcomes. Identifying a causal effect of
legislative institutions is difficult, but the widespread adoption of new institutions
offered an opportunity. I am aware of no study that collected data before and after
the reforms were adopted, across a range of legislatures, to estimate their impact.
Second, the literature’s focus on policymaking under uncertainty faded from legisla-
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tive studies for several decades. Rational choice models with fixed preferences and
full information replaced the informational models. Institutions existed to solve dis-
tributive concerns, such as vote cycling and vote trading, not informational problems
(Arrow 1951, Plott 1967, Shepsle and Weingast 1981, Weingast and Marshall 1988).
In the 1980s, formal theorists re-engaged with informational problems. Formal
models of decision making under uncertainty clarified the problem and proposed
a solution (Crawford and Sobel 1982; Austen-Smith and Riker 1987; Gilligan and
Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Banks 1991). Formal theorists argued that
the information most important, and most lacking, in policymaking was technical
expertise, not political intelligence (Krehbiel 1991, 68; see also Zwier 1979; Webber
1979; Bradley 1980; Cooper and MacKenzie 1981; Sabatier and Whiteman 1985;
Bimber 1991; Mooney 1992). Expertise was unavailable due to agency and collective
action problems. Individual legislators had no incentives to acquire policy expertise
and no credible way to share it. The solution, again, was institutional. Committees
could be granted special parliamentary rights to collect and share policy information.
These models consider information a causal factor throughout the policymaking
process. Informational concerns cause legislators to create committees. They cause
committees to be granted special powers, which in turn cause committees to invest
and share expertise. Committee expertise causes legislators to take certain policy
positions. The logical way to test these models would have been to evaluate the
causal influence of information on committee organization, procedures, and position-
taking.
However, observational studies of information face substantial problems with
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causal inference. Even if information can be measured, which is itself no small task,
there is a fundamental endogeneity issue. Information is not randomly provided.
Party leaders and committees choose when to share expertise (Gilligan and Krebhiel
1987; Curry 2015). Cue-giving is strategic (Box-Steffensmeier, Ryan, and Sokhey
2015). Even the legislature’s organization and agenda are affected by informational
concerns (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). It is practically impossible to identify an ef-
fect of information on individual behavior, institutional design, or policy outcomes
within this web of causal relationships.
Previous empirical studies have shed light on various aspects of policymaking
under uncertainty. Surveys of legislators and archival research have cataloged the
scientific and expert information provided to lawmakers (Caplan, Morrison, and
Stanbaugh 1975; Bradley 1980; Mooney 1992; Amara, Ouimet, and Re´jean 2004;
Brasher 2006). These studies reveal that legislators face not a scarcity, but an over-
whelming abundance of information that leaves them uncertain what information to
trust (Schneier 1970; Kingdon 1989; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). Ethnographic
analyses of position-taking describe legislators’ uncertainty and their reliance on de-
cision making heuristics (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989). Tests of informational models
of committees compare the ideological composition of committees to the floor (Kre-
hbiel 1991; Prince and Overby 2005). These studies built the framework for studying
information. However, they did not directly take up the causal relationships at the
center of the theory.
As a result, the study of information is notable for what is missing: clear causal
evidence that legislators’ incomplete information constrains their behavior; that spe-
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cific institutions increase the quality or quantity of policy information; and that in-
formation influences individual or collective choice. A new methodological approach
is needed to take up these causal claims.
1.2 Methodology
Experiments are a growing part of legislative studies (Grose 2014). Naturally-
occurring lotteries have been used to examine the effects of committee seniority,
committee membership, office location, bill sponsorship, and term length on electoral
and legislative outcomes (Kellerman and Shepsle 2009; Rogowski and Sinclair 2012;
Broockman and Butler 2012; Loewen et al 2014; and Titiunik 2016). Academics
have also conducted their own randomized control trials (RCTs) where legislators
are randomly assigned to a treatment using a proactive assignment procedure. Pre-
vious legislative RCTs have examined interactions between legislators and the public
(Bergan 2009; Butler and Nickerson 2011; Butler and Broockman 2011; Malesky et
al 2012; Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012; Kalla and Broockman 2015; Grose, Mal-
hotra, and Van Houweling 2015). This dissertation extends these studies to study
interactions inside the legislature that are governed by legislative institutions.
Experimentation offers several benefits for the study of information. Most impor-
tantly, experimentation is the gold standard in causal inference. Randomly assigning
information makes it possible to estimate its causal effects independent of other con-
founding factors. Identification allows new tests of information theories that are
much more direct than those available to observational designs.
Second, measuring legislators’ information is hard, but offering legislators infor-
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mation is easy. An observational study of information and voting might require
a costly and time-consuming survey of legislators. It would assume legislators gave
truthful responses, and then make strong statistical assumptions about omitted vari-
ables and the relationship between information and behavior. Providing information
avoids several of these assumptions and difficulties. It sidesteps endogeneity issues
through random assignment. It also is more easily implemented. I have found leg-
islators are more willing to accept information than to confess what they do not
know.
Third, informational interventions can be crafted to suit specific research ques-
tions. The source of information can be specified in the research design. This high
degree of control allows me in this dissertation to compare the effects of informa-
tion from a staffer to information from other legislators. It is also easy to examine
different types of information.
Fourth, legislative experiments are well-suited to the methodology of institution-
alism (Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003). They directly compare the effectiveness of
institutions on outcomes of interest. Experiments also incorporate the broader in-
stitutional context within which they are fielded. Interventions may be effective in
some institutional contexts but not others.
RCTs have drawbacks, too. Experiments in every field face a similar set of issues.
Results may not generalize to other contexts. Randomized interventions occur out
of equilibrium. Many worthy topics of study cannot, and should not, be randomized.
Any study involving human subjects should consider the basic ethical considerations
of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.
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Legislative experiments face unique ethical considerations (Teele 2014). Butler
and Broockman (2011) discuss three issues that arise in their legislative RCT. The
issues, which are deception, personal harm, and collective burden, provide a useful
foundation for evaluating the experiments in this dissertation, as well as legislative
experiments more broadly.
Deception
The experiments in this dissertation provide information to legislators on ran-
domly selected bills. This information is not deceptive. Providing legislators with
untruthful or misleading information about public policy would, in likely any case,
be unethical. Like any scholar testifying before Congress, every effort was made to
provide high-quality, unbiased information about public policy. In this dissertation,
treatments contained technical information from the text of legislation, from analyses
conducted by the Committee for Fiscal Review, and from other reputable sources.
Deception can also apply to subject recruitment. Party leaders, caucus leaders,
and bill sponsors were all informed of and approved the projects in this dissertation.
Even legislators who received information were told that briefings and deliberations
were new efforts to raise awareness of legislation. They were not, however, told
that their behavior would be examined ex post through publicly-available data on
position-taking.
Personal harm
Sophisticated political observers realize that it is impossible for a legislator to
be perfectly informed about every issue on the agenda. Nevertheless, results from
information experiments could be used to attack individual legislators who appear
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less informed than others. While academics have not shied away from scoring the
performance of individual legislators (Volden and Wiseman 2014), there is little
reason to take a personalized approach to the study of information. Informational
issues are ubiquitous in legislatures. At this stage, the behavior of specific individuals
is less important than aggregate trends. As a result, not only are no individual
subjects named in this dissertation, but the legislature itself is described, but not
named.2
Collective burden
Interventions should not burden legislators who already face substantial time and
cognitive constraints. Surveys or audit experiments of legislators may collect data
for academic projects unconnected to legislators’ immediate concerns. They impose
a minimal time burden. The briefings and deliberations in this dissertation occur
regularly in legislatures, presumably because legislators find them useful. There is
good reason to think the specific interventions helped legislators understand real
policy issues.
Like campaign experiments, legislative experiments could influence policy out-
comes. As such, they face an additional consideration in that they could cause harm
to the public, even if the public are not the proximate subjects of the studies. This
is collective harm.
Collective harm
The projects in this dissertation are unlikely to have affected policy outcomes.
Each exerted a light touch. Two of the experiments consisted of legislators receiving
2The legislature’s identity is no secret to my advisors and peers. My dissertation sponsor spoke
with the legislator for whom I interned about my research.
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research reports of information repackaged from other sources in the legislature.
The third consisted of legislators discussing bills with one another. All three are
encouragement designs in the sense that all legislators had access to the experimental
information, even legislators in control conditions. The interventions just encouraged
legislators in the treatment conditions to consider the information more intently.
Nevertheless, out of an abundance of caution, experiments only addressed bipartisan,
broadly supported issue areas.
A harder question is whether academics should participate in interventions that
affect public policy. I firmly favor academics engaging practical, real-world policy
problems. This may require providing expertise that changes the policymaking pro-
cess or leads to different policy outcomes. I discuss the prospects for experimental
evaluation of legislative operations in the concluding chapter, but here I will note
one good rule of thumb for conducting ethical legislative experiments: interventions
should be fielded with the approval and participation of legislators.
Elected officials and bureaucrats have themselves increasingly turned to RCTs to
evaluate government’s performance. The Behavioral Insights Team, originally part of
the Cabinet Office of the British government, and the Office of Evaluation Sciences,
part of the General Services Administration, are two government-affiliated groups
that conduct experiments on behalf of municipal, state, and national governments.
Their studies often deal directly with important public policies. OES has encouraged
student borrowers to repay loans, persuaded pharmacists to prescribe fewer pain
medications, and evaluated the effectiveness of foreign aid programs (OES 2018).
There is no doubt these interventions influence real-world outcomes.
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In cases like this, where government actors choose to alter the delivery of public
services or nudge the public toward different behaviors, the researcher’s contribution
is clear: to provide low-cost expertise in the design and analysis of evaluations and to
make findings available to the public without financial or partisan conflicts of interest.
All interventions in this dissertation were conducted alongside state legislators and
staff, with their approval, support, and exceptional compliance.
1.3 Overview of studies
What follows are three studies of legislators’ ability to make informed public policy.
They describe informational interventions conducted over my two year residency in a
state legislature. The projects were planned and conducted with approval of leaders
from both parties and with the participation of caucus leaders and bill sponsors.
The three interventions examine briefings by legislative staff, cue-taking between
legislators, and caucus deliberations. These are only some of the many ways legis-
lators learn about policy. They also hear about policy during committee hearings,
floor debates, and party meetings. The three interventions were chosen because they
are central to the activity of legislative caucuses.
Caucuses are bipartisan groups of legislators typically organized around specific
issues. They engage with policymaking by collecting and disseminating information.
For example, the Democratic Study Group, one of the first organized caucuses in
Congress, produced such valuable research that executive branch officials, state poli-
cymakers, and even Republican members of Congress requested its reports. Legisla-
tors cite caucuses as one of the most trusted sources of policy information (Kingdon
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1989). They are present in Congress, every state legislature, and parliaments around
the world.3
Unlike committees or parties, caucuses have no formal parliamentary powers.
They cannot control the agenda or restrict amendments in any way. This makes them
ideal for studying information’s effects. Formal powers do not confound informational
influence. The three interventions reflect the informal information-gathering that
legislators pursue on a day-to-day basis, including through caucuses, that is often
difficult to study observationally.
Caucuses are interesting information sources for theoretical reasons as well. In-
formation signaling models are typically studied with respect to committees, but
they are just as relevant to caucuses. Caucuses are groups of policy experts with
heterogeneous ideological predispositions. As such, they should generally be more
influential than groups with homogeneous, extreme ideological preferences (Gilligan
and Krehbiel 1989). Caucuses thus may represent an upper bound against which
other information sources can be compared.
Finally, practical considerations recommend studying information through cau-
cuses. Committees, parties, and floor processes are formally governed by legislative
rules. There are few openings for the researcher to provide new information. In
comparison, caucuses are much more receptive. In most circumstances, caucuses re-
ceive no funding or dedicated staff from the legislature. Instead, they rely on outside
experts to give presentations and answer questions. This is a great opportunity for
academics to share our expertise.
3Caucuses are sometimes called Legislative Service Organizations, Congressional Member Or-
ganizations, or, in parliamentary systems, All-Party Parliamentary Groups.
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The first paper examines foundational issues in information and decision making:
to what extent are legislators’ positions constrained by imperfect information and, as
a result, how responsive are legislators to new policy information? These micro-level
questions underlie macro-level theories of committees, delegation, and lobbying. To
answer these questions, I worked with the Veterans Caucus to provide legislators with
supplemental policy briefings about randomly-selected pending legislation. Briefings
included research reports modeled after committee and caucus reports to provide
realistic and useful information. As the caucus intern, I briefed seventy-six legislators
in one-on-one sessions over a period of a month.
Briefing’s influence is measured primarily through legislators’ cosponsorship. Brief-
ings increased cosponsorship by 60% above baseline rates. This suggests that baseline
information constraints prevented around 40% of possible cosponsorships in the con-
trol group. Briefing effects extend beyond cosponsorship. One bill, drafted with an
error, was covered critically in briefings. Treatment substantially reduced cospon-
sorship and roll call voting support of this bill.
On the whole, briefing effects are largely consistent with predictions from infor-
mation signaling models: 1) on average, providing information helps legislators take
positions by reducing uncertainty; 2) information’s effects are largest when sender
and receiver are ideologically similar; and 3) groups of individuals with heterogeneous
ideological predispositions are credible sources of information.
The next two papers examine how legislators share policy information with one
another. The second paper addresses cue-taking using data from two experiments.
It defines cue-taking in terms of the contagion of briefing effects between legislators.
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Legislators who were not directly briefed, but who shared offices with a directly
briefed legislator, may look to their officemate for a cue. Random assignment of
briefings identifies this secondary, indirect treatment effect. We cannot define its
content — it may result from legislators actively sharing information or passively
observing one another’s behavior. But, if the contagion model is correct, we can be
sure that indirect treatment effects result from cue-taking between legislators.
Direct briefing effects and secondary cue-taking effects are estimated using data
from two experiments. I repurpose data from the first study and combine it with
data from a replication conducted the following year. Notably, the replication was
designed to study intra-office cue-taking. It features a restricted randomization to
increase the number of observations assigned to the cue-taking treatment. This
improves the precision with which cue-taking effects are estimated.
There is strong evidence of cue-taking. Cue-taking is nearly 80% as effective as
direct briefings. Further, cue-taking appears to be purposive. It occurs for bills that
reach the floor, but not bills that fail in committee. We would expect this pattern if
legislators only seek out cues when they are required to vote on legislation.
The third paper addresses group deliberation. Members of the Bipartisan Fresh-
man Caucus randomly selected bills for discussion during caucus meetings. Selected
bills thus received supplemental deliberation above and beyond the discussions that
ordinarily occur in committees and on the floor. This experiment differs from the
prior two in a significant way. The unit of treatment assignment was the bill, not
the legislator-bill dyad. This assignment procedure reduces power for estimation of
information’s effects on individual position-taking, but it allows the estimation of in-
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formation’s effects on bill outcomes. Information may affect bills’ likelihood of being
amended or advancing through the policymaking process.
Position-taking on untreated bill reveals an interesting pattern. Legislators’
cosponsorship and roll call voting in support for bills sponsored by in-partisans con-
sistently exceeds their support for bills sponsored by out-partisans. This is to be
expected. However, this trend holds even if we attempt to hold constant legisla-
tors’ ideological predispositions. After estimating legislators’ ideology using prior
session roll call voting, I plot position-taking by the distance between legislators’
and bill sponsors’ ideal points. Supportive position-taking is lower, at any given
level of ideological distance, on bills sponsored by out-partisans. This “partisan
penalty” is consistent with legislators being more uncertain about bills sponsored by
out-partisans.
Caucus deliberations increased both cosponsorship and roll call voting support
for treated bills. Surprisingly, changes were largest among out-partisans. Although
ceiling effects limit the interpretation of roll call voting effects, it is not clear why de-
liberation increased cosponsorship more across parties than within them. I offer one
possible explanation. Among untreated bills, legislators appear to apply a penalty
to bills sponsored by out-partisans. That is, even holding constant the ideological
similarity of legislators to sponsors inside and outside their own party, legislators
are less likely to support bills from out-partisans. Deliberation reduced and nearly
eliminated this partisan penalty. Legislators’ support of treated bills is still predicted
by their ideological similarity to bill sponsors, but they no longer apply this extra
partisan penalty.
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The overall message from the suite of experiments is that legislators learn about
policy during the lawmaking process. Their positions depend on what they learn.
Legislators do not walk into the legislature knowing what position they will take
on every bill. Instead, the day-to-day activities in a legislature influence individual
choice. For legislative scholars, individual positions must be considered not only an





Facts, research, and information are essential to the healthy functioning of legisla-
tures. Alongside ideological and electoral concerns, information is a major input into
legislators’ decisions whether to support or oppose legislation. As a result, scholars
have paid a great deal of attention to how legislators wade through a complex infor-
mation environment, structure institutions to overcome asymmetric and imperfect
information, and interact with outside information sources to decide which bills to
support (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990; Krehbiel 1991; Mooney 1992; Pot-
ters and van Winden 1992; Austen-Smith 1993; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Hall
and Deardorff 2006).
However, there is little direct, empirical evidence that policy information and
research generated within the legislature influence individual positions or collective
policy outcomes. Few empirical studies examine how information varies across legis-
lators, whether information affects individual behavior, and to what extent institu-
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tions overcome the problem (c.f. Fenno 1973, Kingdon 1989, Jones and Baumgartner
2005). There are formidable measurement and identification challenges to studying
information, as it is not randomly allocated. As a result, studies of imperfect in-
formation rely on indirect empirical tests. Informational models of committees are
substantiated by the ideologies of committee members (Krehbiel 1991). Studies
of lobbying examine which legislators meet with lobbyists (Hojnacki and Kimball
1998). Neither directly examines the question of interest: does providing legislators
with policy research influence their likelihood of supporting a bill? Do legislative
institutions affect cosponsorship or roll call voting by providing information?
This paper revisits the now-classic literature on imperfect information with a
novel research design — a field experiment embedded in a state legislature — to
estimate the effect of policy information on position-taking. Legislators were pro-
vided policy research by a legislative staffer on randomly selected bills. The staffer,
who worked for the Veterans Caucus, conducted one-on-one briefings with subjects
that provided nonpartisan, technical research about veterans bills. By randomizing
briefings across bills, we can compare individual position-taking across treated and
untreated bills. This approach avoids the measurement and identification challenges
that characterize observational studies of policy research.
This paper contributes to the study of legislating under imperfect information
in several ways. First and foremost, it shows that policy research affects position-
taking. On average, legislators are 60% more likely to support bills if they are
provided research. While most briefings painted bills in a positive light, one bill was
covered negatively due to flaws in its drafting. Legislators briefed on this bill were
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less likely to cosponsor and vote for it.
Second, the empirical design directly engages with formal models of information
exchange. While previous experimental work on informational models of committees
have been limited to the laboratory (Battaglini et al 2016), this paper provides
several tests of these models in the field. In several respects, findings are consistent
with predictions of these models: 1) on average, providing research helps legislators
take supportive positions by reducing uncertainty; 2) information’s effects are largest
when sender and receiver are similar; and 3) groups of experts with heterogeneous
ideologies and partisan affiliations make for trusted information sources.
The final contribution is to clarify the public policy implications of imperfect
information. The briefings’ influence reveals that at least some legislators refrain
from taking positions due to information constraints. The inability or unwillingness
to take positions may lead to paralysis as risk averse legislators delay approving
proposals (Binder 2004, 31). However, improving information is not a free lunch,
as information caused polarization. Legislators predisposed to support legislation
were convinced to do so, but legislators who were unlikely to support bills were
not convinced of their merits. The end result is that the treatment made it easier
for legislators to align positions with their predispositions. In this surprising way,
information constraints might limit polarization.
2.1 Imperfect information in a state legislature
Observers have long noted that legislators cannot often draw on their own deep policy
expertise when making decisions (Mill 1861; Bryce 1906; Luce 1924; Kingdon 1989;
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Krehbiel 1991). Legislators have heterogeneous and incomplete information about
policy. As the core of this paper examines whether policy research helps legislators
make decisions, the first question to ask is whether legislators appear constrained by
imperfect information in the first place.
Directly measuring information is difficult, so I instead examine whether the be-
havioral consequents of information vary across legislators and over time as predicted
by theory.1 In particular, institutions, electoral incentives, and legislators’ own back-
grounds should lead them to have varying expertise and information about issues. Is
it the case that legislators whom we would expect to have less information are also
less likely to take positions?
In this state legislature,2 patterns of position-taking suggest that legislators are
indeed constrained by imperfect information. Both sponsorship and cosponsorship
vary across legislators and over time in the manner predicted by informational the-
ories of position-taking. The constraints observed in this legislature are likely to be
found in most legislative contexts.
Institutional context
The legislature resembles many other state legislatures in the United States. It is
characterized by low professionalism. It ranks in the bottom half of Squire’s (2007)
index with its part-time legislators, little staff support, short annual sessions, and
1We should be hesitant to infer that information causes observed behavior — after all, that is
the motivation for the experiment that constitutes the core of this paper. Nevertheless, observing
that behavior changes with institutional factors would be consistent with the broader story about
information effects.
2The state is not named in order to preserve ongoing research projects in the legislature.
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modest legislative salaries. Nevertheless, there are at least a dozen states that rank
lower.
There were unique institutional features in the legislature of interest. First, al-
though most interest groups engaged in lobbying, veterans groups did not. Of the
579 lobbyists representing 737 separate groups registered with the state ethics com-
mission, none represented veterans. The legislature also lacked a dedicated veterans
committee. Thirty-six states convened a full standing committee on Veterans or
Military Affairs in their lower chambers,3 but the state where the intervention was
fielded did not.
With no standing committee, the legislature had, in past years, established a bi-
cameral committee on veterans affairs. This committee behaved as a regular standing
committee, conducting hearings, communicating with interest groups, and working
with the state Department of Veterans Affairs. The committee appeared to fulfill an
important role. The Department of Veterans Affairs wrote that it was “most helpful
in obtaining support for veterans legislation in the General Assembly” (Comptroller
Report 2011, 37). Nevertheless, the joint committee was abolished as part of a leg-
islative reorganization years before this study was conducted, so no committee held
exclusive jurisdiction over veterans issues.
The termination of the joint committee offers an opportunity to examine its
relationship to position-taking. Figure 2.1 plots the percentage of veterans bills
cosponsored by each legislator for two assemblies during which the joint committee
was operational and the assembly after which it was eliminated. Legislators serving
3Includes the Government, Military, and Veterans Affairs Committee in the Nebraska Unicam-
eral Legislature. Data from state legislative websites. Data collected for 2015 to 2016 sessions.
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on the committee are indicated by circles; committee members who had served on the
committee and remained in the legislature after its closing are indicated by triangles.
Figure 2.1 shows a significant decline in cosponsorship after the joint committee was
abolished. The median House member cosponsored 11.1% of veterans bills in the first
assembly included in the analysis, 12.5% in the second, and 4.7% in the assembly
after the committee’s closing. Median Senate cosponsorship declined from 17.6% to
15.9% to 10.5% over the three assemblies.4 Results are not driven by committee
members, and placebo tests show that declines in bill cosponsorship were unique to
veterans bills (see Appendix A.2).
A plausible interpretation of this data is that the joint committee served an
important informational role. It provided legislators with policy information that
they needed in order to take positions on veterans bills. Once it was eliminated,
legislators were less informed and more reluctant to take positions.5
Legislator characteristics
Legislators’ personal experience can also affect their information. Legislators who
previously had served in the military have first-hand knowledge of the issues facing
veterans. As a result, we would expect veterans to be more informed and thus more
likely to engage with veterans affairs than other legislators. We cannot differentiate
4The decline in average cosponsorship from the second to third assembly in the House was
6.9 percentage points (p < 0.001 two-sided from t-test) and in the Senate 5.1 percentage points
(p = 0.016).
5Alternative explanations find little support. The committee was not discontinued due to any
veterans-specific issue: the committee was eliminated as part of a broader legislative restructuring
driven by other committees that generated large operating costs. The number of veterans bills































Joint Veterans Committee Member Member (Former) Not on committee
Figure 2.1: Veterans bills cosponsored per legislator.
information from other factors that might affect position-taking (like ideology), but
we can at least examine whether veterans are more engaged in the issue.
Veterans cosponsored more veterans legislation than non-veterans. In the House,
they cosponsored 10.4% of veterans bills, while non-veterans cosponsored 5.4%, a
difference of 5.0 percentage points (p < 0.05). In the Senate, there is a minimal
difference in cosponsorship (12.1% among veterans and 12.0% among nonveterans).
Bill sponsorship is another important form of position-taking that requires infor-
mation. Veterans were more active than others in bill sponsorship as well. Although
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only 25 of 99 representatives and 4 of 33 senators were veterans, they accounted for
a disproportionate share of veterans bills sponsored. 30 of the 43 veterans bills filed
in the lower chamber came from veterans, as did 18 of the 38 bills filed in the upper
chamber. These rates are substantially higher than we would expect by chance if
all legislators were equally likely to file veterans bills.6 Between sponsorship and
cosponsorship, it is clear veterans were more likely to support veterans legislation
than their peers, which is at least consistent with, if not demonstrably a result of,
being well-informed about veterans issues.
Electoral incentives
Another factor that might lead legislators to acquire varying amounts of policy in-
formation is the electoral incentive. The desire to be re-elected drives legislators to
engage with important constituencies in their district. Like any constituent group,
veterans make up a larger portion of some districts than others. This natural varia-
tion allows us to examine whether legislators’ cosponsorship of veterans bills corre-
lates with the number of veterans in their districts.
The veterans population in each district is calculated from data provided by the
state Department of Veterans’ Affairs.7 Veterans make up 5.2% – 14.2% of district
populations, with a statewide average of 7.7%. Districts with the largest veterans’
6Pearson’s chi-square tests indicate that it is extremely unlikely that the higher rates of veterans
sponsorship arose by chance (p < 0.01 for both chambers).
7The Department provided the number of veterans in each county as of 2014 which, together
with the total population in the county, was used to calculate the veterans population in each
county. The state legislative website lists which counties each legislator represents, although it does
not break out how much of each legislator’s district falls within each county. As a result, each
district’s veterans’ population was estimated as the simple, unweighted average of the veterans’
population of each county represented by the legislator.
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presence feature a large military base.8 These districts do not drive the results
reported below.
Figure 2.2 plots legislators’ cosponsorship of veterans legislation against the vet-
erans population in their district. It covers the three general assemblies prior to the
intervention. Each point represents a legislator’s cosponsorship in a given assembly.
To illustrate that differences across legislators do not result from membership on the
select committee, joint veterans committee members are again indicated by circles
and triangles. A loess curve is fit to the raw data.
Cosponsorship increases with districts’ veterans population. House and Senate
members who represent districts with the most veterans are among the most support-
ive of veterans legislation. There is also a positive correlation for other legislators. In
the House, the legislator representing the fewest veterans cosponsored 7.4% of vet-
erans bills while the legislator representing the median number cosponsored 14.0%.
In the Senate, the relationship is even stronger. These results are unique to veterans
issues. Placebo tests show that legislators representing more veterans were no more
likely to cosponsor non-veterans legislation (see Appendix A.2).
Legislators’ position-taking varies across individuals and in response to institu-
tional variation as we would expect if legislators are constrained by imperfect infor-
mation. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. It is unclear how
much information is the causal factor. Ideology also affects position-taking, and it
may be correlated with information. Other factors, such as the broader political con-
text or changes to the legislative agenda, might also drive results. These difficulties
8The base is shared by two House districts and one Senate district. House and Senate districts
are single-member, but the base is split across two districts.
27
House Senate





















Joint Veterans Committee Member Member (Former) Not on committee
Figure 2.2: Veterans bills cosponsored per legislator, by district veterans popu-
lation.
recommend experimentation to study the role of information on position-taking.
2.2 An experiment on bill briefings
The experiment examines the effect of policy-relevant research on position-taking.
Legislators were assigned to an in-person, one-on-one policy briefing with a staffer.
The staffer discussed the problem addressed, fiscal considerations, and statutory
changes the bill would effect (Bimber 1991). Technical information came from bill
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sponsors, leaders, the office for fiscal review, the state code, and independent research
reports from federal agencies and academics. Importantly, all printed research re-
ports, which were handed out to legislators to guide discussion, prominently featured
the sponsors of the bills. Table 2.1 displays an illustrative research report, scrubbed
of information that would readily identify the state. The goal was for legislators to
come away from meetings with a greater understanding of legislation.
The staffer worked for the Veterans Caucus, not an individual legislator or com-
mittee. Caucuses are trusted sources of information inside the legislature (Kingdon
1989; Hammond 2001; Ringe, Victor, and Carman 2013). They frequently employ
staff to produce research reports. Like committees, they are typically bipartisan and
composed of legislators with heterogeneous ideologies. According to information sig-
naling models, this should make them more trusted than single individuals or groups
of homogeneous individuals.
Care was taken to ensure that the treatment was policy information, not social
pressure, valence, or political intelligence. Legislators were told that the briefing was
a new initiative by the caucus to provide information, but that the caucus had not
endorsed any of the bills. Indeed, the preferences of other politicians and interest
groups were not discussed. It was made clear to legislators that the caucus’ effort
was intended to spread information about veterans legislation, but that the bills still
belonged to the sponsors. The caucus had no input into the legislation, but it was
responsible for the information in the briefing.
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Table 2.1: Illustrative research report.
Bill Removing Limits on ROTC Courses for Scholarship
Students
Sponsors House Sponsor / Senate Sponsor
Overview Scholarships at public universities are not available to stu-
dents who surpass a threshold number of credit hours.
ROTC courses count toward this cap, causing students to
become ineligible for the scholarship.
Bill excludes ROTC courses from relevant cap.
Current Law Requirements to be eligible for this public scholarship:
1. Receive the scholarship for no more than 8 semesters.
2. Must have completed fewer than 120 credit hours.
3. Must maintain a minimum GPA.
Problem Army ROTC requires one elective and one laboratory course
per semester for 2-4 years.
Navy ROTC requires one naval science course per semester
in addition to courses in Calculus, Physics, English, National
Security, and World Culture / Regional Studies.
Cap can cost ROTC students 2 semesters of eligibil-
ity for the public scholarship.
Solution Exempt ROTC courses from the cap.
Cost Increase of $200,000+ per year in state education
funding.
Information that could identify the state of interest is removed.
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Experimental units
To increase power, multiple bills and legislators were included in the study. Sixteen
veterans bills were selected for inclusion. They represented nearly all veterans bills
proposed during the session. Seventy-six legislators were included. Subjects included
first-term representatives and committee chairs, members of both parties, and mem-
bers and non-members of the veterans caucus.9 Party leaders, the caucus chair, and
the caucus chair’s officemate were excluded from the study due to their familiar-
ity with the purposes and scope of the study. Nevertheless, 75% of the chamber’s
membership was included.
Treatment assignment occurred at the legislator-bill dyad level.10 With 76 leg-
islators and 16 bills, there are a total of 1,216 legislator-bill dyads. Four bills were
selected for treatment for each legislator through block random assignment. This cre-
ated 304 observations where legislators were briefed on a bill and 912 observations
where they were not briefed.
Including multiple bills offers opportunities and drawbacks. First, it yields vastly
more observations than previous experimental studies of position-taking. Second,
legislator-specific treatment effects are identified because each legislator is assigned
to treatment for some bills and control for others. Third, bill-specific treatment
effects are identified for the same reason. The downside of including multiple bills
is that it requires an additional non-interference assumption: treatment is assumed
9Eighteen legislators were caucus members and 58 were not. The caucus did not discuss the
legislation during its meetings during that session.
10Because dyads and not legislators were the unit of assignment, the analyses reported below do
not need to cluster standard errors at the legislator level (Green, Kim, and Yoon 2001).
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not to diffuse across bills. Fortunately, there is little evidence that it does.11
Compliance
A notable feature of the intervention is the high level of compliance with treatment.
Of the 76 legislators who were approached for meetings, all accepted. 74 were success-
fully briefed in person over a three week period.12 All meetings covered all assigned
bills.
Outcome measures
Bill cosponsorship is a key form of position-taking, frequently examined in academic
research (Mayhew 1974; Koger 2003; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Highton and Rocca
2005; Talbert and Potoski 2002; Cho and Fowler 2010). Like any form of position-
taking, cosponsorship signals legislators’ priorities and their policy interests. It is im-
portant legislators cosponsor the “right” bills (Campbell 1982; Bernhard and Sulkin
2013). Cosponsoring the wrong bills can cost a legislator electoral support.
In some ways, cosponsorship is a better indicator of individual priorities than roll
call voting. Former Senator Richard Lugar explains:
11All legislative experiments with multiple legislators assume treatment does not spill over be-
tween legislators. This assumption seems strong, so it is addressed in the next chapter via a
standalone study of treatment contagion across legislators. There is evidence of contagion across
legislators, but allowing for it does not change the results reported in this paper. There is no
evidence of contagion across bills.
12Two were not briefed in person, as they were unable to make their scheduled appointments.
The first legislator was briefed by phone as she drove from her district to the Capitol. The second
was unable to meet at the appointed time due to a scheduling conflict. His assistant was briefed in
his absence.
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“Members’ voting decisions are often contextual and can be influenced
by parliamentary circumstances. Sponsorships and co-sponsorships, in
contrast, exist as very carefully considered declarations of where a legis-
lator stands on an issue” (Lugar 2017).
Members cosponsor far fewer bills than they vote for, so the barrier to cosponsorship,
whether informational or preferential, is higher. Witnessing a cosponsorship is a
strong indicator of a legislator’s policy preference.
Roll call voting is a secondary outcome of interest. Only six of the sixteen bills
in the study reached the House floor, and only one bill received any No votes. Bills
failed in committee not because they were particularly unpopular or seriously flawed.
Typically their failure came down to fiscal considerations. For example, the bill
described in Table 2.1 was probably not enacted due to its $200,000 projected cost,
not because legislators found it politically advantageous to oppose scholarships for
ROTC students. Even bills that failed intended to help veterans, so we would expect
legislators to cosponsor them for all the same reasons that they take positions on
popular bills that are unlikely to become law.
Since not all bills reached a vote, it is unclear whether intent-to-treat effects on
roll call voting can be estimated for all bills that reach a vote. Doing so would require
assumptions about the relationship between treatment and whether bills received a
vote. To avoid making these assumptions, I take another approach. I estimate the
average treatment effect for the one contested bill. The estimated average treatment
effect for that bill may not be generalizable to others, but it is an unbiased estimate
of the true treatment effect for that bill. Since roll call voting is not the primary
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outcome of interest, observing effects on one bill is sufficient to show that policy
research can influence position-taking activities other than cosponsorship.
Results
Table 2.2 displays bill cosponsorship by treatment assignment.13 The control group
contains three times as many observations as the treatment group because each
legislator was assigned to treatment for 25% of bills. In the control group, 8.1% of
observations were cosponsored; in the treatment group, 13.5%. The difference-in-
means average treatment effect estimate (ÂTE) is 5.4 percentage points.





Cosponsorship Rate 8.1% 13.5%
ÂTE is also estimated through linear regression with bill and legislator specific
fixed effects:14
Yij = α + γ1Legislator1 + γ2Legislator2 + ... + γ75Legislator75+
δ1Bill1 + δ2Bill2 + ... + δ15Bill15+
βdij + ij
(2.1)
13Bill sponsorship is included in cosponsorship.
14Cosponsorship was concentrated on one piece of legislation that received 56 signatures. Due
to this potential outlier, treatment effects are estimated using bill-specific intercepts and even bill-
specific treatment effects. Results are not driven by the outlying bill.
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where Yij is cosponsorship by legislator i of bill j; γ1 through γ75 are estimated
legislator specific fixed effects; δ1 through δ15 are estimated bill specific fixed effects;
15
and dij is a treatment indicator. β is the ATE. ATE estimates obtained from logistic
regression are available in Appendix A.3.16 Robust standard errors and one-tailed
p-values are presented for all estimators.17
The information treatment increased cosponsorship by 5.0 to 5.4 percentage
points (p < 0.01 for all estimates). Including legislator and bill fixed effects does
not substantially alter estimates. These effects are substantial in magnitude. Only
8.1% of bills were cosponsored in the control group, so treatment increased cospon-
sorship by over 60% from the baseline rate.
One bill merits individual attention. Bill 16 was the only bill to be contested on
the House floor. It was also the only bill to be clearly flawed as originally drafted.
The sponsor of Bill 16 stated that there was an error in its drafting. The nature of
the error is beyond the scope of this paper, but it was severe enough to engender
opposition from powerful lobbyists and interest groups. The sponsor quickly recog-
nized the need to correct the error, so the bill was ultimately amended to remove the
offending provisions, but not until after briefings had been held. Although it was not
intended, this bill allows us to examine what happens when legislators are informed
about a flawed bill.
Table 2.4 shows the effect of treatment on cosponsorship and roll call voting for
15One legislator and one bill serve as the baseline for comparison.
16Freedman (2008) shows that logistic regression with covariates can lead to biased ATE esti-
mates. Nevertheless, I present the logistic regression results due to possible concerns about the
binary dependent variable.
17Standard errors and significance tests were verified with randomization inference, which yielded
smaller standard errors and p-values in all cases.
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95% C.I. (0.011,0.096) (0.016,0.084)
Regression Model Simple Multiple
Fixed Effects(a) No Yes
N 1,216 1,216
(a) Bill and legislator fixed effects.
Logistic regression estimates converted to predicted probabilities.
Robust standard errors and p-values presented.
One-tailed p-values indicated at p < .05 (*), p < .01 (**).
Bill 16. Baseline support for the bill is quite high. 78% of untreated legislators
cosponsored the bill, as the sponsor called for cosponsors during floor debate after
it had been amended. 93% voted for the bill. Treated legislators were less likely
to cosponsor and vote for the bill. Cosponsorship was 16 percentage points lower
among treated than untreated legislators (p < 0.10 one-sided from randomization
inference). Treated legislators also voted for the bill at a 17 percentage point lower
rate (p < 0.05 one-sided).18 Despite the sponsors’ blandishments, treated legislators
hesitated when asked to support the bill.
Analyzing a single bill limits the scope of findings. Estimating treatment effects
18No votes include legislators voting “No”, “Present Not Voting”, or who elected not to vote.
Since the legislature requires a majority of all 99 members to pass — not a majority of those voting
— legislators often elect not to vote instead of casting a vote against a peer’s bill. Restricting the
analysis to those who voted “Yes”, “No”, or “Present Not Voting” does not change the results.
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Fixed Effects(a) No No
N 76 76
(a) Bill and legislator fixed effects.
Significance indicated at p < 0.05 (∗) and p < 0.01 (∗∗) one-sided. Stan-
dard errors and p-values obtained using randomization inference with 10,000
simulated treatment assignments.
on a single bill, chosen ex post, exposes these analyses to valid “garden of forking
path” criticisms (Gelman and Loken 2013). It is also not clear that this bill is
representative of others. Nevertheless, it illuminates a meaningful phenomenon. At
least once, learning that a bill had flaws was enough to convince legislators not to
support it. This is reassuring to those of us who think legislators should consider not
just partisanship and ideology when taking positions, but also whether a proposal
makes for good policy. Once the bill was fixed, it passed.
Treatment effect heterogeneity
Now let us turn to a more direct engagement with information signaling models.
These models argue that information is beneficial to all legislators because it reduces
uncertainty (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990). As long as the information provider is “not
too far” in preferences from the receiver, she can truthfully communicate helpful
information. However, there are two distinct reasons to expect information’s effects
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to vary across legislators.
Both reasons suggest briefings should be more influential among legislators predis-
posed to support a bill. One of the main predictions of information signaling models
is that communication is easier between like-minded individuals (Crawford and So-
bel 1982; Austen-Smith and Riker 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987, 1989, 1990).
Although briefings were conducted by an ostensibly nonpartisan caucus staffer, leg-
islators still may have interpreted information in light of who sponsored the bill.
Thus briefings on appealing bills might be deemed more trustworthy.
Information will be heterogeneously influential for a second reason. Although
information increases all legislators’ utility by reducing uncertainty, we do not ob-
serve utility. We observe a binary indicator, cosponsorship, based on utility. So we
must have some idea of how utility translates into cosponsorship. Prior work argues
legislators cosponsor bills only if their expected utility surpasses a utility threshold
(Peress 2013). Since baseline cosponsorship rates are low, the legislators closest to
the threshold (but below it) will be those predisposed to support proposals. Thus
equal shifts in utility will cause only potentially supportive legislators to cross over
the threshold.19
Legislators’ predisposition to support experimental bills is predicted by legisla-
tors’ cosponsorship of non-experimental bills. Cosponsorship has frequently been
used to construct similarity scores between legislators (Talbert and Potoski 2002;
Fowler 2006; Aleman et al 2009; Peress 2013), so Cosponsorship Similarity scores are
calculated between each subject and bill sponsor. For this study, cosponsorship sim-
19For more information on the choice model underlying cosponsorship, see Appendix A.1.
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ilarity is more predictive of the outcome variable than other measures of ideological
similarity based on roll call voting or campaign donations.20 Campaign finance-based
ideology scores are also not available for many of the legislators. Results below show
that cosponsorship similarity is highly predictive of cosponsorship of experimental
bills.









where Cosponsorship Similarity between experimental subject i and bill sponsor j
equals the sum over all bills B not included in the study of those cosponsored by
both i and j scaled by the total number of bills cosponsored by j.21 Cosponsorship
similarity can be understood as the prior probability of subject i cosponsoring an
experimental bill by sponsor j based on the frequency of i cosponsoring j’s non-
experimental bills.
Two sets of cosponsorship similarity scores are constructed. One set uses cospon-
sorship from the session before the intervention was fielded. This measure is pre-
treatment, but it is not available for first-term subjects. A second set uses cosponsor-
ship from the session during which the intervention was fielded. These measures are
available for all legislators, but they risk bias if the intervention influenced cospon-
sorship of non-experimental bills. I present results using both sets of cosponsorship
20Neither campaign donation- or roll call voting-based measures are predictive of cosponsorship
in this sample.
21Results are robust to scaling by the number of bills cosponsored by i.
39
similarity, since there is little evidence or reason to suspect that the intervention
spilled over across bills.
Heterogeneous treatment effects can be estimated by modifying Equation 2.1 to
include an interaction between treatment and cosponsorship similarity:
Yij = α + γ1Legislator1 + γ2Legislator2 + ... + γ75Legislator75
+ δ1Bill1 + δ2Bill2 + ... + δ15Bill15




The key parameters of interest are β2 and β3. If there are similarity-independent
effects of treatment, β2 will be positive. If there is a similarity-based marginal ef-
fect, as predicted in signaling models, β3 will be positive. Figure 2.3 illustrates
hypothesized patterns of effects. Equation 2.2 is estimated using both measures of
cosponsorship similarity, with and without legislator and bill-specific fixed effects.22
Figure 2.4 displays the experimental data, with observations binned due to the
binary nature of cosponsorship. Control (dark blue, solid) and treated (light brown,
dashed) observations do not differ much at low levels of cosponsorship similarity.
However, at the average level of similarity (0.17), treated legislators are twice as likely
22Excluded from the display are dummy variables that indicate whether the subject sponsored
the bill and whether the subject/sponsor was treated. Sponsors are defined as cosponsors and have
similarity scores of 1, by construction. As a result, a mechanical relation would increase the param-
eters β1 and β3 because every observation with a cosponsorship similarity score of 1 corresponds
to Yij = 1. Including these dummy variables, which is analogous to dropping observations where
the sponsor was the subject, redefines parameter estimates as the change in cosponsorship observed
among non-sponsors of the bill of interest.
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(a) Similarity-independent effect. (b) Similarity-based marginal effect.
Figure 2.3: Hypothesized heterogeneous briefing effects.
Figure 2.4: Observed heterogeneous briefing effects.
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to cosponsor as untreated legislators (10.7% to 5.1%), with the difference continuing
to grow as similarity increases.
Table 2.5 displays regression results. First, cosponsorship similarity is highly
predictive of observed cosponsorship. A one percentage point increase in similarity
is associated with a 0.59 to 0.68 percentage point increase in cosponsorship in the
two specifications without legislator fixed effects. Even accounting for legislator
and bill fixed effects, a one percentage point increase in cosponsorship similarity is
associated with a 0.33 to 0.61 percentage point increase in cosponsorship. This is
strong validation of the cosponsorship similarity measure.
We turn now to the primary estimands of interest. Estimates of the similarity-
independent effect βˆ2 range from -2.9 to -0.5 percentage points. They cannot be
differentiated from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast,
estimates of the similarity-based marginal effect βˆ3 are positive and substantial in
magnitude in each specification. The effect ranges from 0.3 to 0.5 (p < 0.05 two-
tailed using current session measures). Not only was treatment more influential
among subjects predisposed to support bills, but the treatment also doubled the a
priori predictive relationship between cosponsorship similarity and cosponsorship of
veterans bills.
How exactly should we interpret results that treatment was primarily effective
among like-minded legislators? Cosponsorship similarity is an imperfect measure
of ideology. It is not purely a function of ideology. It also depends on legislators’
personal relationships with peers.23 Thus it is safer to say that “like-minded” legis-
23It is unclear whether cosponsorship is more susceptible to non-ideological factors than roll call
voting or campaign giving, or how the distinction between ideological and non-ideological factors
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Table 2.5: Estimated heterogeneous briefing effects.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cosponsorship Similarity 0.332∗∗ 0.678∗∗ 0.620∗∗ 0.760∗∗
ŜE (0.121) (0.114) (0.170) (0.163)
d −0.025 −0.029 −0.005 −0.028
(0.029) (0.031) (0.050) (0.060)
d∗ Cosponsorship Similarity 0.470∗ 0.515∗ 0.250 0.369
(0.198) (0.223) (0.288) (0.366)
Post-treatment covariate Yes Yes No No
Fixed effects(a) Yes No Yes No
Subjects All Legislators Returning Legislators
N 1,216 1,216 915 915
Significant at p < 0.05 (∗), and p < 0.01 (∗∗) two-tailed.
(a) Legislator and bill-specific fixed effects.
Robust standard errors and p-values presented.
lators are more influenced by briefings than to ascribe differences in briefing effects
to a particular factor like ideology. Ultimately, any heterogeneous effect should be
interpreted with caution. Unlike main effects of briefings on cosponsorship, heteroge-
neous effects depend on non-randomized factors. Thus it might be best to interpret
these results as consistent with predictions from information signaling models but
not confirmative.
is determined in the first place.
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Alternative explanations
The analyses in this study assume that briefings communicated some policy-relevant
information. What if that was not the case? What if legislators already knew the
content of bills, or did not learn anything from the treatment? Why would the
briefings be influential?
One alternative explanation is that treatment made it easier for supporters of
veterans bills to do so publicly. Convincing legislators to make private support pub-
lic is important, of course, but it could occur even if the briefings did not convey
any bill-related information. Did the briefings just draw out latent supporters? Fig-
ure 2.5 suggests that they did not. It displays estimated individual treatment effects
against legislators’ cosponsorship of veterans bills in the assembly before the inter-
vention.24 There is little evidence that treatment effects increase with prior veterans
cosponsorship. Effects initially increase in prior cosponsorship, but then decrease.
Prior cosponsorship of veterans bills does not explain heterogeneous effects across
legislators by cosponsorship similarity.
A second alternative explanation is that briefings made legislators aware of bills
that, absent treatment, they would have ignored. This explanation would diminish
the practical significance and generalizability of results. While educational and infor-
mative briefings might influence other forms of legislative behavior, raising awareness
24Individual treatment effects are estimated with substantial uncertainty. Figure A.3 plots the
magnitude of individual effects against their probability of occurring under the sharp null hypoth-
esis. Individual effects reach conventional levels of statistical significance only when they approach
50 percentage points. For this reason I examine aggregate trends, not specific legislators. Overall
trends are demonstrated by the white loess line fit to the individual treatment effects, with its
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Figure 2.5: Estimated legislator-specific briefing effects.
would not. After all, when legislators vote on bills, they are, one hopes, aware they
exist.
We can leverage bills’ differential progress through the policymaking system to
address this question. Assume that all legislators become aware of bills that reach a
roll call vote. In fact, many legislators cosponsor bills as they are discussed on the
floor, because it is the first time they become aware of them. If legislators are aware
of bills that reach a vote, we would observe briefing effects due to raising awareness
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only for bills that do not reach the floor.
Bills that reached the floor exhibit nearly identical estimated treatment effects
on cosponsorship (5.8 percentage points) as bills that did not (5.2). The difference
of 0.6 percentage points is not statistically significant (p = 0.88 two-tailed from t-
test). This evidence speaks against briefings simply raising awareness of legislation.
It seems briefings actually communicated information that legislators were not able
to get otherwise, including during floor debates.
2.3 Discussion of briefing’s effectiveness
The experiment described in this study is unusual in at least four respects. First,
information concerning real policy proposals was delivered directly to legislators.
Second, treatment was delivered through a legislative institution thought to address
informational problems. Third, it examines behavioral outcomes — bill cosponsor-
ship and voting. Fourth, it included multiple bills for a well-powered suite of tests.
Like most experiments, there are strong concerns about the generalizability of
findings. A one page caucus research report probably will not change U.S. Senators’
positions on Obamacare or other highly salient policies. Policy research may only
be influential for broadly-supported issues, and only among relatively unprofessional
legislators. It may be more important to cosponsorship than roll call voting. These
are legitimate concerns, and the only way to address them is through more research.
One of the benefits of this paper is that it provides a touchstone in the study of
informational influence. Future work should speak to differences across legislatures,
issues, and institutions.
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These findings provide a benchmark in the study of legislative professionalism.
Untreated legislators cosponsored legislation at approximately 60% the rate of treated,
more informed legislators. If this study is indicative of other issues considered by
the legislature, information constraints influence 40% of legislators’ cosponsorship
decisions. This is a clear, quantitative measure of information constraint. With such
a measure, scholars can repeat this intervention in other legislatures, with different
institutions and profiles of legislators, to see how constraints vary and how close




Every session, legislators consider thousands of policy proposals, covering a wide
range of issues, under severe time constraints. With such a workload, it is simply
not feasible to expect any individual to develop detailed knowledge about most bills.
As a result, it is little surprise that legislators are often described as poorly informed
about public policy (Mill 1861; Treadway 1938; Kingdon 1989; Krehbiel 1991). Nev-
ertheless, legislators are expected to vote for and cosponsor bills that are important
to constituents (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002). So how do uninformed
legislators take the right positions?
Legislators can overcome individual information constraints by relying on cues
from their peers (Matthews and Stimson 1975; Kingdon 1989; Masket 2008; Box-
Steffensmeier, Ryan, and Sokhey 2015). Legislators often give advice to one another
about which position they should take. This guidance may be formal, such as an
instruction from a party leader, or informal, such as one legislator observing the
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vote of another. Cues effectively allow the decision-maker to take her fully-informed
position without actually becoming fully-informed about the issue. Legislators report
that cue-taking is important to anywhere between 40% (Kingdon 1989) and 75%
(Matthews and Stimson 1975) of their votes. Observational studies find cue-taking
influences about 10% of votes (Masket 2008). It seems clear that cue-taking is an
important factor in position-taking.
More rigorous research designs have found less evidence of cue-taking. Rogowski
and Sinclair (2012) leverage the random assignment of office space in Congress to
estimate the causal effect of office proximity on position-taking. Coppock (2014,
2016) estimates cue-taking between ideologically-similar legislators exposed to a ran-
domized information treatment by Butler and Nickerson (2011). Unlike survey or
observational studies, neither experimental study finds consequential cue-taking.
These contradictory findings illustrate how much is unknown about cue-taking.
Whom do legislators look to for cues? Perhaps deskmates (Masket 2008) and friends
(Matthews and Stimson 1975) share information, but not office neighbors (Rogowski
and Sinclair 2012) or ideologically-similar legislators (Coppock 2016). What happens
if a typical cue-giver is unavailable? Legislators may be able to replace one cue-giver
with another. Did cue-taking decline between the early study of Matthews and
Stimson and the later studies of Rogowski and Sinclair and Coppock?
This study addresses these questions about cue-taking with a large dataset from
two legislative field experiments. The experiments randomly provided legislators with
technical policy information about real bills through one-on-one briefings conducted
by a legislative staffer. This information substantially affected position-taking by
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legislators who were directly briefed. The primary research question of this study
is whether position-taking changed among unbriefed legislators who worked in close
contact with briefed peers. This study contributes to the literature on cue-taking
in at least four ways: (1) by illustrating that the causal effect of cue-taking can be
estimated through an experiment that models contagion; (2) by providing precisely-
estimated cue-taking effects due to the number of observations and a restricted ran-
domization that improves power; (3) by estimating heterogeneous cue-taking effects
by whether bills reach the floor; and (4) by estimating cue-taking for alternative
contagion models.
3.1 Cue-taking and contagion
“Unlike his colleagues in the laboratory sciences, who are able to
create experimental conditions at their whim, the political scientist is
obliged to wait until the conditions happen to present themselves in the
real world.” (Kingdon 1989, 133-134).
In the past decade, experimental research designs have gained popularity in leg-
islative studies. Among many other interesting works, foundational experiments have
examined the causal effect of information treatments on constituency service (But-
ler and Broockman 2011); constituents’ access to legislators (Kalla and Broockman
2015); and legislators’ voting behavior (Bergan 2009; Butler and Nickerson 2011)
and home style (Butler, Karpowitz, and Pope 2012). As pathbreaking as they have
been, these studies have largely ignored cue-taking or interpersonal influence between
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legislators (cf. Coppock 2016).
At first, experiments might seem an odd method for studying cue-taking. Exper-
iments often rely on the “stable unit treatment value assumption” (SUTVA), also
known as “non-interference.” Non-interference declares that each subject’s potential
outcome is unaffected by the treatment status of others. Treatment contagion, or
spillover, violates the assumption. Non-interference is typically necessary to identify
the causal effect of a treatment on individual behavior. If interference occurs in
unknown ways, estimating treatment effects becomes practically impossible.
Interference can be an opportunity, not just a nuisance. Treatment effects are
identified not only for those subjects directly treated, but also for subjects exposed
to treatment spillovers. Spillovers are only identified, however, if the spillover model
is known.
There have been two general approaches to modeling treatment contagion. One
approach allows a broad network of spillover in which contagion is allowed between
any subjects who interact with one another (Bowers, Frederickson, and Panagopoulos
2013; Coppock 2016). This approach is appealing because it can completely relax the
strict non-interference assumption; any subject can influence any other. However,
it requires strong modeling assumptions to combine the spillovers from different
sources into a single measure of aggregate treatment exposure for each subject. It
also requires assumptions to model behavior as a function of aggregate exposure.
A second approach allows interference within narrow subgroups of subjects, but
not across them. For example, Nickerson (2008) and Foos and de Rooij (2017)
estimate contagion of a get-out-the-vote treatment within households assuming non-
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interference between households. In choosing an approach, the researcher must decide
whether contagion is likely to be more diffuse or more limited in a given context.
This study examines contagion between the legislative equivalent of households:
offices. In this state, a majority of legislators share office suites. Their assistants
sit in a common room beyond which each legislator has a private office. Legislators
have wide latitude in choosing their office suites. As a result, officemates tend to
represent similar, often neighboring districts, and to be friends. Officemates will
share information even if friendship, ideology, or electoral incentives underlie the
true contagion network.
Let us define the potential outcomes that can result if treatment diffuses within
offices. Legislators’ potential outcomes (Yi) are a function of their own (di) and
their officemate’s (d¬i) treatment statuses: Yi(di, d¬i).1 To fix ideas, a legislator’s
cosponsorship decision may be the result of whether she receives a policy briefing
and whether her officemate receives a briefing.
Figure 3.1 illustrates direct (T ) and secondary (S) treatment effects between
two subjects when one individual receives direct treatment (Nickerson 2008; Foos
and de Rooij 2017). Secondary treatment equates to cue-taking. It may result
from conscious information-sharing or from legislators’ mimicking the positions of
their peers. The content of the secondary treatment cannot be strictly defined, but
with random assignment and the right spillover model, we are sure that secondary
treatment is the portion of the briefing effects transmitted between legislators, that
is, by cues.
1This discussion assumes full compliance with treatment.
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This restricted model is commonly used in experimental analyses of contagion.
It is restricted because at most one individual in each pair is assigned to treatment.
Assigning exactly one individual maximizes power for the estimation of T and S.
What if both individuals are assigned to treatment?






Assigning both subjects in a pair to direct treatment introduces new causal ef-
fects. In Figure 3.2, each effect (T and S) is conditioned by whether the other
effect is also present. TS=0 indicates an individual who is assigned to direct but not
secondary treatment, and TS=1 an individual who is assigned to both. This raises
a complication. Are direct effects independent of secondary effects? That is, does
TS=0 = TS=1 and ST=0 = ST=1? We simply don’t know, and the strong assump-
tion that effects are additive is typically unwarranted in social science applications
(Hudgens and Halloran 2008; Aronow and Samii 2013; Bowers, Frederickson, and
Panagopoulos 2013). As a result, we cannot separately estimate TS=1 or ST=1. We
can, however, estimate the combined effect of TS=1 + ST=1. Table 3.1 demonstrates
how direct briefing (TS=0), secondary cue-taking (ST=0), and combined (TS=1+ST=1)
treatment effects can be estimated from the full factorial design that allows treatment
by treatment interaction.2
2Note that attempting to estimate TS=1 by taking the difference E[Yi|di = 1, d¬i = 1] −
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Table 3.1: Identification of briefing and cue-taking treatment effects.
D¬i = 0 D¬i = 1
Di = 0 (1) E[Yi|di = 0, d¬i = 0] (2) E[Yi|di = 0, d¬i = 1] ST=0 = (2) - (1)
Di = 1 (3) E[Yi|di = 1, d¬i = 0] (4) E[Yi|di = 1, d¬i = 1] Missing
TS=0 = (3) - (1) Missing TS=1 + ST=1 = (4) - (1)
One additional quantity of interest is relevant to studies of cue-taking. The




(Nickerson 2008). The contagion rate describes the percentage of
direct treatment that diffuses between individuals. For studies of cue-taking, it is
the percentage change in the position of a cue-taker that results from changing the
position of her cue-giver.
With these estimands defined, we can pose several hypotheses regarding cue-
E[Yi|di = 0, d¬i = 1] implicitly assumes ST=1 = ST=0.
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taking:
H1: Cue-taking affects position-taking. ST=0 > 0, α > 0
Legislators are thought to take cues from one another (Kingdon 1989). As a
result, secondary treatment effects, and thus the contagion rate, should be positive.
But how prevalent and influential is this cue-taking? Is it an occasional behavior or
one that guides the majority of decisions legislators make? The larger the contagion
rate, the greater the percentage of legislators’ positions that depend on cues from
peers.
H2: Exposing a legislator to a cue will exert no additional effect if the
legislator has already received a direct briefing. TS=1 + ST=1 = TS=0.
H3: Briefing a legislator who has been exposed to a cue will exert no
additional effect. TS=1 + ST=1 = ST=0.
H2 and H3 describe a world in which briefings and cues are perfect substitutes.
They also describe treatments that lead legislators to their fully-informed positions.
It is possible one of the treatments, but not the other, leads to fully-informed posi-
tions (which is why the hypotheses are stated separately). A more modest proposition
is that cues and briefings are imperfect substitutes. In that case, the combined effects
of direct and secondary treatments would be smaller than the sum of their separate
effects (TS=1 + ST=1 < TS=0 + ST=0).
H4: The combined effects of briefings and cues will be greater than
the sum of their separate effects. TS=1 + ST=1 > TS=0 + ST=0.
H4 describes briefings and cues as complements. Repeated messaging may mag-
nify the effectiveness of individual messages. Experimental evidence among voters
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finds that repeated campaign messaging leads to larger behavioral effects than one-off
communications (Green and Zelizer 2017; Zelizer 2018). This finding would suggest
that even after receiving a briefing or a cue, legislators retain some uncertainty about
legislation that is diminished by further information-sharing.
3.2 An experiment on bill briefings and cue-taking
To estimate the causal effect of information on legislators’ position-taking, two ex-
periments were conducted over a two-year assembly in the same state legislature as
the previous chapter.
Treatment
A staffer for the Veterans Caucus conducted one-on-one policy briefings with legis-
lators to discuss randomly-selected veterans legislation. In-person briefings ensure
that treatment is only administered to the assigned legislator. Briefings included
both an oral discussion and a printed research report that contained bill-specific pol-
icy analyses (see Table 2.1 in the prior chapter for an illustrative research report used
in a bill briefing). Analyses included the problem addressed, fiscal considerations,
and statutory changes the bills would effect (Bimber 1991). Information came from
bill sponsors, the caucus chair, the committee for fiscal review, the state code, and
independent research reports from federal agencies and academics.
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Units
The unit of random assignment was the legislator-bill dyad. The first study included
76 legislators and 16 bills, and the second included 81 legislators and 16 bills, for a
total of 2,512 observations. Over 75% of the legislature’s membership was included
in the studies. The 32 bills represented nearly all veterans legislation sponsored over
the two years.
Treatment assignment
In each study, legislators were briefed on four of the sixteen eligible bills. Assignment
procedures differed slightly across the two studies. The first study selected bills for
treatment using block random assignment within legislator.3 Treatment assignment
was independent across legislators, which allowed multiple legislators in each office
suite to be assigned to direct treatment for the same bill.
The second study features three complications to its assignment procedure. First,
it included an additional treatment arm. Briefings were delivered either by the caucus
staffer or by an advocate for a veterans’ interest group. To maintain parallelism
between the studies (and because the advocate treatment appears to have been
minimally effective; see Appendix B.2), advocate treatment effects are not displayed
in the analyses below.4
3As in any block randomized design, the fact that some blocks (in this case, legislators) may
be more prone to a particular outcome or more susceptible to treatment does not bias estimates or
require standard errors to be clustered at the block level (Gerber and Green 2012).
4All estimators for staffer treatment effects take the advocate treatment into account. Hereafter
the “staffer” term is dropped, as treatment refers only to the activities of the staffer.
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Second, legislators were prohibited from receiving briefings from both the caucus
staffer and the advocate. Legislators were first assigned to either the caucus staffer,
advocate, or no treatment condition, and then assigned to be briefed on four of
the sixteen eligible bills. This multi-level assignment requires standard errors to be
clustered.5
Third, restricted randomization ensured that no two legislators in the same office
were assigned to direct treatment for the same bill. With two treatment arms,
interactions between direct and secondary treatment for the staffer and advocate
treatments would have yielded an unmanageable number of potential outcomes. The
restriction maximizes the number of observations exposed only to cues.
Compliance
Both interventions featured high rates of compliance. In Study 1, 74 of the 76
legislators (97%) were briefed in-person. In Study 2, 25 of the 29 legislators (86%)
were briefed.6 Due to noncompliance, analyses below estimate intent-to-treat effects
(ITT). ITTs represent the average change in cosponsorship of assigning a unit to
treatment and do not account for whether units actually received the treatment.
5It is not exactly clear what level should be used for the clustering. Although assignment was
not performed at the level of the individual legislator-bill dyad, it also was not performed at the level
of the legislator. Standard errors could be clustered at the level of the legislator out of conservatism,
or standard errors can be obtained through randomization inference. I adopt the latter approach.




Cosponsorship is an important form of position-taking. It signals to agenda setters
the breadth of support for legislators’ proposals (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Har-
bridge 2015). Unlike roll call voting, cosponsorship is largely unaffected by parlia-
mentary circumstances or party whipping (Lugar 2017). Spatial models of position-
taking predict that uncertainty will diminish legislators’ willingness to cosponsor
legislation, so briefings and cues will relax these constraints and promote cosponsor-
ship (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987; Peress 2013).
Spillover model
Contagion is modeled between legislators who share office suites. Due to space
constraints in the capitol building, 68 of the 76 legislators in Study 1 and 62 of the
81 legislators in Study 2 shared office suites. Assignment to offices is not random,
and legislators frequently maneuver to occupy suites with friends. Legislators in
one-person offices are dropped, as they cannot be assigned to secondary treatment.
This leaves 2,080 legislator-bill observations.7
There are two- and three-person office suites in the capital. This raises two
complications. First, probabilities of assignment to secondary treatment vary across
office sizes. Inverse probability weights account for these differences (Gerber and
Green 2012). Second, legislators in three-person suites could be exposed to spillover
through both suitemates. Due to the small number of such observations, they are




Table 3.2 displays weighted average cosponsorship rates by direct and secondary
treatment assignment, with the number of observations in each condition in parenthe-
ses. The rows represent a legislator’s own briefing assignment (Di) and the columns
the assignment of her officemate (D¬i). The untreated coponsorship rate is 10.4%.
Cosponsorship rates are higher among all three treatment conditions at 19.1 – 20.8%.
Table 3.2: Summary of cosponsorship by briefing and cue-taking assignment.
Cue-taking















Observations assigned to the advocate
(200) or multiple caucus spillover treat-
ments (36) are omitted.
To account for imbalance in the profile of bills assigned to treatment,9 treatment
effects are estimated with weighted least squares regression with bill- and legislator-
specific fixed effects:10
8Nevertheless, all estimators take into account the possibility of multiple cue-taking assignments.
9Table B.1 in Appendix B.2 shows that controlling for bill- and legislator-specific fixed effects
diminishes the magnitude of the staffer treatment effect in the second study. Bills with high baseline
probabilities of cosponsorship were, by chance, disproportionately assigned to the caucus treatment.
To prevent conflating treatment effects with the effects of the skewed actualization, estimation must
account for the imbalance in baseline cosponsorship probabilities across bills.
10Appendix B.2 displays robustness checks. Table B.2 presents results without legislator-specific
dummy variables, since their large number diminishes degrees of freedom. Table B.3 presents results










g1Bill 1b + g2Bill 2b + · · ·+ gB−1Bill B-1b−1+
h1Leg 1i + h2Leg 2i + · · ·+ hI−1Leg I-1i−1 + uib
(3.1)
where Yib indicates cosponsorship by legislator i on bill b; the three indicator variables
di¬iib indicate ego and alter treatment assignment for legislator i and bill b, and uib
represents unmeasured determinants of cosponsorship. Bill and legislator-specific in-
dicator variables account for varying baseline levels of cosponsorship. d10ib represents
legislators assigned only to briefings; d01ib legislators assigned only to cue-taking; and
d11ib legislators assigned to the combined treatment. The key parameters of interest
are b1, b2, and b3, the average intent-to-treat effects of briefings, cues, and combined
treatments. Standard errors and p-values are obtained through randomization in-
ference. 10,000 simulated treatment assignments yield the sampling distribution of
treatment effects under the sharp null hypothesis.
Table 3.3 presents results. Estimated effects of briefings and cues are positive,
substantial in magnitude, and unlikely to have occurred by chance. Estimated brief-
ing effects are 4.5 percentage points (p < 0.05 one-sided), and estimated cue-taking
effects 3.5 percentage points (p < 0.05 one-sided). These estimates are large relative
to the 10% baseline rate of cosponsorship. Briefing effects allowing for inter-office
contagion (4.5) are similar in magnitude to briefing effects in the previous chapter
assuming strict non-interference (5.0 - 5.4).11
11This chapter includes a larger subject population. For an apples-to-apples comparison, see
Appendix B.2.
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Table 3.3: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects.
Briefing Cue-taking Combined
TS=0 ST=0 TS=1 + ST=1
ÎTT 4.5 3.5 11.8
(ŜE) (1.9) (1.6) (2.9)
N(a) 2,080 2,080 2,080
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization
inference and 10,000 simulated assignments.
Observations assigned to advocate direct or secondary
treatment (200) or multiple staffer secondary treatments
(36) are not displayed.
How do briefings and cue-taking treatments relate to one another? The estimated
contagion rate α is 79%. This rate is toward the high end of the range of estimates
from the observational literature. For the bills in this study, for every 10 cospon-
sorships encouraged through briefings, 8 additional cosponsorships followed through
cue-taking.
The combined effects of briefings and cue-taking are 11.8 percentage points (p <
0.001 one-sided). To determine whether combined effects are significantly larger
than the sum of standalone briefing and cue-taking effects, 10,000 simulations were
conducted under the hypothesis that the combined effect equaled the sum of the
standalone effects.12 Only 4.9% of simulations yielded estimates larger than 11.8
percentage points.
These results are instructive in several respects. First, information is highly
influential whether it reaches legislators directly or second-hand. Estimated effects
12The full schedule of potential outcomes was created under the assumption TS=0 = 4.5pp and
ST=0 = 3.5pp.
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are large in magnitude compared to baseline cosponsorship rates, suggesting that
information constraints are binding on many decisions. Second, position-taking is
highly contagious. Cosponsorship contagion rates within legislative offices are even
larger than voting contagion rates within households (Nickerson 2008; Foos and de
Rooij 2017). Third, briefings and cues are complementary. Legislators are responsive
to repeated information treatments.
Extensions
In his canonical study of cue-taking, Kingdon (1989) describes legislators waiting
until the last minute, often as the roll is called, to ask peers for guidance. This
implies a purposive view of cue-taking. Legislators consciously seek out instruction
from one another to overcome their informational constraints. It stands in contrast
to a more incidental form of cue-taking in which information is shared through casual
interactions. If legislators engage in purposive cue-taking, they will seek information
only when they are required to evaluate legislation. For most legislators, this would
mean a bill must reach the floor before they focus on it. As a result, secondary effects
will occur only for bills that reach the floor.
Bills reached the floor after treatments were delivered, so bill progress is a post-
treatment covariate. If treatments affected which bills reached the floor, estimates
of heterogeneous briefing and cue effects on cosponsorship by bill progress would be
biased. However, it is unlikely that these particular treatments affected bill progress.
Treatment was assigned at the individual, not bill, level, so all bills were assigned
to treatment for some legislators. Further, most observations were assigned to the
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control condition. Three-fourths of observations in Study 1 and over four-fifths in
Study 2 were assigned to the control group. So despite large individual effects of
treatment on cosponsorship, aggregate effects are modest.
Table 3.4 presents results from Equation 3.1 fit separately for the 17 bills that
failed in committee and the 15 bills that reached the floor. Regression yields con-
ditional average treatment effects (CATEs) based on bill progress. CATEs are esti-
mated treatment effects among subsets of the population; they are not causal esti-
mates of bill progress on cosponsorship.13
Briefings generated large positive direct and combined effects regardless of whether
bills reached a vote. In fact, estimated briefing effects are larger for bills that failed
in committee (5.2 percentage points; p < 0.05) than bills that reached the floor
(3.4 percentage points). This pattern is consistent with floor debate diminishing
the informational disadvantage of untreated legislators relative to treated legislators,
although the difference falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance.
Cue-taking appears influential only for bills that reached the floor. Estimated cue-
taking effects for bills that failed in committee are 0.3 percentage points compared
to 8.6 percentage points for bills that reached the floor. Legislators appear to engage
in cue-taking only when bills reach a vote.
The focus of this paper is cue-taking within offices. Indeed, the second experiment
assigned briefings in order to maximize power for the estimation of within-office cue-
taking. However, legislators may engage in cue-taking in other ways. Legislators
13For a similar reason, one would not cluster standard errors by bill. CATEs compare cospon-
sorship between observations that were and were not assigned to treatment for two disjoint subsets
of the sample. They do not estimate the effect of the bill-level covariate on outcomes.
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Table 3.4: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects by bill progress.
Briefing Cue-taking Combined
TS=0 ST=0 TS=1 + ST=1
Bills that Failed in Committee
ÎTT 5.2 0.3 9.5
(ŜE) (2.2) (1.9) (3.6)
N 1,114 1,114 1,114
Bills that Reached the Floor
ÎTT 3.4 8.6 13.9
(ŜE) (3.3) (2.9) (5.0)
N 966 966 966
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization
inference and 10,000 simulated assignments.
Observations assigned to advocate direct or secondary
treatment (200) or multiple staffer secondary treatments
(36) are not displayed.
may share information with their deskmates on the chamber floor (Masket 2008),
peers from similar districts, and ideologically-similar peers (Coppock 2014). Perhaps
one of these relationships is more relevant to cue-taking than legislators’ offices.
Table 3.5 displays estimated briefing and cue-taking effects for each of these
alternative spillover models.14 Cue-taking is estimated separately for each type of
relationship using Equation 3.1. Regressions use the same subset of data in which
each subject was eligible for spillover from an officemate, deskmate, neighboring
representative, or ideological peer.15 This leaves 1,760 observations, compared to the
14Appendix B.1 describes the spillover networks for each alternative cue-taking relationship.
15Not all legislators shared desks with another experimental subject. As a result, each contagion
model could use different subsets of the data.
65
2,080 observations in the main analysis of office contagion.
Table 3.5: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects under alternate spillover
models.
Offices Desks Districts Ideology
Briefing (T̂S=0) 4.7 2.9 5.8 4.0
(ŜE) (2.0) (4.8) (5.0) (4.9)
(N) (210) (218) (219) (228)
Cue-taking (ŜT=0) 3.7 2.3 3.6 2.3
(1.8) (4.8) (5.1) (4.9)
(328) (230) (220) (252)
Combined (T̂S=1 + ŜT=1) 10.3 16.7 8.4 14.3
(3.1) (6.5) (6.8) (6.5)
(80) (73) (68) (57)
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization infer-
ence and 1,000 simulated assignments.
Interest group treatment and multiple indirect treatment conditions omitted.
Weights equal to inverse of probability of treatment assignment.
Covariates include bill and legislator dummy variables.
Estimated direct effects are positive in each model, ranging from 2.9 to 5.8 per-
centage points. We would not expect changing the contagion model to significantly
affect estimates of direct treatment. Estimated secondary effects are also positive
in each model, but estimated effects are largest in the office model (3.7 percentage
points), followed by district proximity (3.6), ideology (2.3) and desk (2.3) models.
Effects are estimated imprecisely, so we cannot differentiate estimates from the alter-
native models. Estimated standard errors for secondary treatment under the office
model (1.8 percentage points) are significantly smaller than standard errors under the
alternative models (4.8 to 5.1 percentage points) due to the restricted randomization.
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The restricted randomization was employed with respect to intraoffice spillover,
not spillover in the alternative models. The restriction prevented observations from
being assigned to a mix of advocate and staffer treatments or, in the second study,
multiple staffer spillover treatments. This serves two purposes. The staffer by advo-
cate interaction conditions are excluded from the main analysis, so the more units
that are assigned to them, the fewer units that are available for estimating the treat-
ment effects of interest. Treatment by treatment interaction conditions are also low
probability events. Despite being unlikely for any given observation, the units that
are assigned to these conditions receive extreme inverse probability weights, which
harms precision of the estimates.
3.3 Discussion of cue-taking’s effectiveness
Many quantitative analyses and formal theories treat legislators as atomistic actors
with immutable policy positions. The results in this study show that strong non-
interference assumptions about legislative behavior, explicit in many experiments
but also implicit in many observational studies, are unwarranted in at least some
contexts.
The strength of this research design is the identification of causal effects, but it
suffers from numerous external validity concerns. First, the intervention provided a
specific type of information that may not be representative of legislators’ day-to-day
discussions. Technical policy information may differ from political intelligence such
as polling or the preferences of other politicians. Further, briefings were conducted
by a staffer for a bipartisan caucus, which may be more trusted and influential than
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other information sources. The experiments included bills in an issue area with
broad, bipartisan support.
Second, the contagion network in this legislature may not represent other net-
works. The network itself was not randomly assigned, so effects cannot be attributed
solely to sharing an office. Observed effects may conflate office sharing with a differ-
ent underlying causal pathway, such as legislators’ friendships. Further, the degree
of interoffice communication likely varies across offices and over time in ways that
may affect the magnitude of cue-taking in other contexts.
Third, while this paper relaxed the non-interference assumption with respect to
legislators, it still assumes strict non-interference across bills. It took this approach
because of the prominence of studies of cue-taking between legislators, but the as-
sumption that legislators evaluate each bill independently of other legislation on the
agenda is supported by no empirical evidence. Non-interference across bills could be
violated if briefings addressed similar proposals or if subjects interpreted bills being
omitted from briefings as an indication of their quality.16
Fourth, cosponsorship is an important position-taking behavior, but its relative
low cost may make it particularly well-suited to observing contagion. Roll call voting
may be immune to interference because it is more directly consequential to policy
outcomes or more closely monitored by party leaders. At the same time, the fact that
party leaders actively whip roll call votes suggests it too is subject to interpersonal
influence.
16The experiments were designed to avoid such inferences by informing subjects that time con-
straints necessitated picking a subset of bills, that the briefings were an effort to spread information,
and that briefings did not represent a valence judgment by the caucus.
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Fifth, two studies were conducted, but in the same legislature. Although this
legislature shares many characteristics with other state legislatures, it may not rep-
resent other legislative contexts. Legislatures with more staff support may exhibit
less diffusion if legislators outsource information-gathering to aides. On the other
hand, diffusion may be stronger if aides collaborate across offices.
Each of these external validity concerns is an empirical question and an oppor-
tunity for further research (Nickerson 2008). A key contribution of this paper is to
illustrate that the large-scale experiments needed for studying contagion are possible
in legislative studies. Further, incorporating a model of contagion into the exper-
imental design itself improves precision and facilitates the estimation of secondary
effects.
If contagion occurs in other legislative experiments, then legislators may be even
more responsive to informational interventions than is currently thought. Contagion
might cause particularly large attenuation in estimated effects in block-randomized
designs, since blocks contain like-minded legislators who might share information
(Butler and Nickerson 2011; Kalla and Broockman 2015). That said, contagion may
attenuate or exaggerate treatment effects on a case-by-case basis.
This design does not identify the mechanism underlying cue-taking. Legislators
may discuss the nuts and bolts of policy with one another or they may seek out a
word or two of guidance as they are voting. Cue-taking may occur through public
displays of bill support like cosponsorship such that a cue-giver is unaware that she
is actually influencing others. Mediation analyses face daunting obstacles, but there
is potentially much to be learned from creative designs that set out to measure or
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manipulate mediators (Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010).
Finally, cue-taking raises questions about the effects of homophily on legislative
outcomes. Legislative networks are characterized by like-minded individuals associ-
ating with one another. For example, no legislator in this study shared an office with
a member of the opposing party. If contagion occurs across homophilic networks,
improving information may exacerbate rather than ameliorate divisions. Reforms to
reduce polarization should encourage information-sharing between dissimilar peers,




“Few in their right mind will argue that [Congress] suffers from too
much deliberation, analysis, or thought.” - Senator Howell Heflin (via
Loomis 2000, 9)
A defining feature of representative lawmaking, deliberation has drawn attention
from statesmen and scholars for centuries. Deliberative processes are thought to
legitimize the aims and methods of democratic government and improve its policy
outputs (Bessette 1997; Habermas 1997; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987). Despite its
importance to democratic theory, there is little evidence that legislative deliberation
actually affects policymaking. This study examines whether effective deliberation is
possible in today’s legislatures. To what extent does deliberation change minds or
shape legislators’ policy positions? This micro-level question speaks to broad debates
about partisanship and effective lawmaking in contemporary legislatures.
Any study of deliberation as a consequential policymaking activity must confront
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the widely-held belief that legislators have fixed policy positions (Smith 1989; Connor
and Oppenheimer 1993; Bessette 1994; Landa and Meirowitz 2009). Legislators
either pursue their own strongly-held personal preferences or represent the wishes of
constituents. Either way, they have made up their minds before they even enter the
legislature. In this case, open-minded deliberation does not occur. Legislators may
use deliberative processes to appeal to voters, but deliberation is political theater
with no immediate impact on policymaking.
For deliberation to change legislators’ minds, policy positions must be suscepti-
ble to influence. Parliamentarians and legislators were among the first to note that
legislators’ policy positions often change, sometimes in response to diligent investi-
gation and research, at other times in response to baseless rumors or “anonymous
whispers” (Treadway 1938, 114; see also Chadwick and Gilbert 1887; Ilbert 1901;
Luce 1924; Mason 1938). Formal theorists have developed several reasons why in-
formation broadly conceived may influence policy positions. Information clarifies
the relationship between policy instruments and outcomes (Gilligan and Krehbiel
1987; Austen-Smith and Fedderson 2006; Meirowitz 2006). Deliberation may help
legislators discover which of many conflicting decision making consideration is most
important for a given bill (Maass 1983; Hafer and Landa 2007; Dickson, Hafer, and
Landa 2008). Legislators’ positions may be based on a biased view of the world in
the first place, so information may correct or exacerbate these pre-existing biases
(Lodge and Taber 2005, 2013). For any of these reasons, deliberation may change
positions.
The literature can hold two such contradictory attitudes regarding the stability
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of individual positions due to the lack of empirical evidence. Existing empirical work
on deliberation only partly addresses its influence on individual or collective choice.
Many case studies trace the formation of policy proposals through public discourse,
but they do not claim discourse causally influences policy outcomes (Landy, Roberts,
and Thomas 1990; Granstaff 1999; Derthick and Quirk 2001; Mucciaroni and Quirk
2006; Wirls 2007). Studies have measured the quantity or quality of speech, perhaps
to show how deliberation varies with institutions, but they cannot identify the effect
of particular institutions on discourse (Smith 1989; Sinclair 1989; Connor and Op-
penheimer 1993; Steenbergen et al 2003; Bara, Weale, and Biquelet 2007; Ba¨chtiger
et al. 2008; Taylor 2012). These approaches address parts of the causal process
— whether quality deliberation occurs and whether policy changes during deliber-
ation — but they do not connect deliberation to policy outcomes using a causal
identification strategy.
To estimate whether deliberation affects legislators’ individual positions, I con-
ducted a field experiment in a state legislature. Certain bills were randomly selected
for supplemental deliberation among a bipartisan group of legislators. This study
breaks ground in several ways: 1) by estimating the causal effect of deliberation on
individual position-taking; 2) by assessing the impact of deliberation on bill-level
outcomes; 3) by examining deliberation effects within and across party lines; and 4)
by exploring the limits of deliberation.
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4.1 Deliberation in partisan legislatures
Given the severe polarization of contemporary politics, it may not be possible for
legislators to engage in open-minded deliberation. Partisan bickering and grand-
standing have overwhelmed debate in committees and on the floor. A “partisan
steamroller” (Sinclair 2014, 345) has replaced once civil and bipartisan committee
proceedings (Manley 1965; Fenno 1973; Lee 2016). Long-serving Republican Sena-
tor John McCain described the current state of partisan policymaking in Congress:
“Our national political campaigns never stop. We seem convinced that majorities
exist to impose their will with few concessions and that minorities exist to prevent
the party in power from doing anything important” (McCain 2017). This does not
sound conducive to effective deliberation.
Effective deliberation is difficult between dissimilar legislators for several reasons.
In principal-agent models of information-sharing, even if an agent has private infor-
mation that will improve a policy, she may not share it with a principal who has
divergent interests. It is not hard to imagine that a partisan legislator may refuse to
share her expertise with members of the opposing party. Further, deliberation helps
legislators decide which decision making consideration should guide their choice. Of-
ten it seems Republicans and Democrats talk past one another, with each refusing
to acknowledge the considerations advanced by the other. Finally, the limited ex-
perimental research on legislators’ decision making finds they are subject to a range
of cognitive biases (Sheffer et al 2017). Most troubling is that partisan lawmakers
seem to reach different conclusions from the same factual information (Baekgaard et
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al 2017). Bipartisan deliberation, or deliberation between any groups of dissimilar
legislators, seems unlikely.
I argue that bipartisan deliberation can be effective if there is asymmetric in-
formation across party lines. The idea is based on canonical information signaling
models. In these models, legislators do not take positions due to uncertainty about
policy proposals (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). The more uncertain they are, the less
likely they are to take a position. As a result, providing information, perhaps through
deliberation, is particularly effective when information is most scarce. Although the
models predict that truthful communication is easier between like-minded legisla-
tors, there may be more to communicate between dissimilar legislators.1 In some
situations, legislators’ skepticism of certain peers will be outweighed by the novelty
and import of the information. In a sense, the best hope for effective bipartisan
deliberation is that legislators interact so little across party lines in the first place.
There are several reasons to think legislators are particularly uninformed about
proposals from out-partisans. Policy information is often transmitted through par-
tisan channels (Smith 2007). Party leaders monopolize information to control their
caucuses (Curry 2015). Legislators take cues from like-minded peers who are more
likely to be in-partisans (Kingdon 1989). In-partisans also likely represent more sim-
ilar districts and have more similar personal ideologies than out-partisans. For all
of these reasons, it is plausible that asymmetric information across parties causes
a “partisan penalty” in bill support. Legislators’ uncertainty about bills from out-
1This idea of information asymmetries underlies weak-tie models of sociological networks (Gra-
novetter 1973; see also Ringe, Victor and Carman 2013). See Appendix A.1 for a more formal
discussion of the effect of uncertainty on position-taking.
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partisans decreases their support independent of the bills’ content.
This theory, derived from signaling models and ethnographic studies of informa-
tion in legislatures, suggests the following primary hypothesis about the effect of
deliberation on individual behavior:
H1: Deliberation will increase aggregate bill support among legislators
including out-partisans.
Deliberation will increase overall bill support if three conditions are met: 1)
uncertainty constrains legislators’ support for legislation; 2) information reduces un-
certainty; and 3) informative communication is possible. This last condition may
be more difficult to satisfy between dissimilar legislators. However, if information
asymmetries are severe enough, deliberation may prove even more effective across
parties than within them.2
Secondary hypotheses address the effects of deliberation on the disposition of
legislation:
H2: Deliberation will increase bargaining over bill content.
Legislators are reluctant to amend legislation if they are uncertain about its con-
tent. In fact, if information constraints are severe enough, legislative principals will
restrict their ability to amend legislation to improve informational efficiency (Gilli-
gan and Krehbiel 1989). Since deliberation improves information, it should make
legislators other than the sponsor more likely to amend proposals. I examine both
the number of amendments filed and the number successfully attached to legislation.
2Deliberation could also correct legislators’ prior expectations about the bills’ content. In
this case, deliberation would likely increase support among some legislators and decrease it among
others. Results from each experiment are less consistent with this mechanism than with uncertainty
reduction.
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H3: Deliberation will increase the probability of bill passage.
Deliberation can help bring bills to the floor if large cosponsorship coalitions signal
to agenda setters that a bill is broadly popular and merits plenary time (Kessler and
Krehbiel 1996). Cosponsorship can also signal to agenda setters that a bill will not
roll the majority party (Cox and McCubbins 1993). Deliberation may also convince
skeptical legislators to vote for the proposal.
4.2 An experiment on deliberation
An experimental approach identifies the causal effect of bipartisan deliberation on
legislators’ policy positions. The design is similar in spirit to deliberative polls con-
ducted among voters (Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell 2002; Farrar et al. 2009). There is
a notable difference in that legislative deliberation is potentially more consequential
to policy outcomes.
Subjects
The intervention was conducted with members of the Bipartisan Freshman Caucus
(BFC). Caucuses are voluntary, informal, and typically bipartisan groups that focus
on policy-making (Hammond 2001; Dilger and Glassman 2014; Ringe, Victor and
Carman 2013). Lacking formal gatekeeping or proposal powers, they are thought
to affect policymaking as clearinghouses of information. Caucuses in Congress and
state legislatures have exploded in number since the 1970s, during the same period as
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the floor and committees began losing their reputations for cooperation and honest
deliberation (Sinclair 1989).
The BFC is unique because its members are all first-term legislators.3 First-term
legislators are thought to be more partisan than their more senior colleagues because
they lack relationships with peers across the aisle (Francis 1962; Price and Bell 1970;
Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson 1993; Sarbaugh-Thomas et al 2006). To the extent
novice legislators are particularly uninformed about policy or one another, they may
be particularly responsive to deliberation.
Recruitment and assignment procedure
A caucus staffer conferred with BFC members (or with their staff) to select at least
two bills per member that the member would be willing to present to the caucus.
The 16 members of the BFC proposed 45 bills in total, ranging from two to five per
member. One bill was selected at random by the caucus staff for each member to
present at a BFC meeting. Because each member was allowed to present only once,
the probability of treatment assignment varies across members. Inverse probability
weights are used in all analyses below for this reason.
Legislatures are busy places, and legislators do not always attend meetings. Cau-
cus meetings are no exception. Only nine BFC members, responsible for 25 bills,
attended caucus meetings. Bills sponsored by absentee members are dropped from
the analysis. Bills can be dropped without introducing bias because legislators were
3Many legislatures feature first-term caucuses, as new members face unique challenges adjusting
to the legislature. For example, first-term caucuses may invite audio-visual staff to discuss resources
for engaging with the media. In some cases, first-term caucuses even organize across party lines to
advocate for more representation of new legislators on desirable committees.
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informed of treatment assignment only after they revealed their attendance (see be-
low for an extended discussion on this topic). Figure 4.1 displays the procedure for
selecting bills, assigning them to treatment conditions, dropping bills, and adminis-
tering treatment.
Figure 4.1: Deliberation experiment procedure
















Treatment is the opportunity to present a bill at a caucus meeting. This design
gave sponsors the opportunity to discuss their bills but did not dictate the content
of the discussion. This relatively light touch preserves realism and minimizes the
researcher’s role in crafting information. One result of this light touch, however, is
that treatment cannot be defined as a particular persuasive or informational message.
Nevertheless, presentations generally contained both technical policy information and
persuasive appeals.
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Sponsors often began with a detailed discussion of technical, substantive policy
information. One bill allowed public buses to drive on highway shoulders to ease
traffic congestion. The sponsor described which highways would be eligible for the
program and the program’s flawless safety record in another state. Legislators usually
took questions about how bills related to current law. Members asked whether a bill
to fine car drivers for blocking bike lanes could be addressed under existing statutes.
Members discussed what proposals would cost if enacted.
Legislators also made more persuasive appeals. The sponsor of a bill to provide
opioid antagonists to first responders noted that his brother-in-law had passed away
from an opioid overdose. Legislators flaunted support from important interest groups
or executive branch officials. The public transit bill was supported by the state
Department of Transportation, while a bill to mandate the use of child safety seats
was endorsed by numerous children’s hospitals. Overall, sponsors focused on the
practical effects of their legislation or their sincere reasons for sponsoring it. They
largely avoided discussing ideological or partisan considerations, and none explicitly
invoked electoral motivations.
Outcome measures
Legislators’ individual positions on legislation are the main outcome of interest.
Cosponsorship and roll call voting are both important forms of position-taking (May-
hew 1974; Koger 2003; Highton and Rocca 2005; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Per-
ess 2013; Wawro 2000; Woon 2008). Harbridge (2015) argues that cosponsorship
is particularly relevant to studies of bipartisanship. Bipartisanship occurs early in
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the process, in deciding which bills reach the legislative agenda. For this reason,
bill sponsors build diverse coalitions of cosponsors to signal to agenda setters the
breadth of support for their proposals (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996). Bipartisanship
will go unnoticed if scholars focus on roll call voting alone.
Whereas cosponsorship is voluntary and holds no formal role in the policymaking
process, roll call voting directly determines whether bills become law. However,
roll call voting is not the ideal experimental outcome measure. Since bills that do
not reach the floor do not experience a vote, there is attrition in roll call data. If
treatment affects attrition, the large observed rates of attrition would preclude the
precise estimation of treatment effects on roll call voting.
I can, and do, examine whether treatment increased or decreased the probabil-
ity of a bill reaching a vote, but I cannot prove that treatment exerted no effect.
As a result, for the analysis of roll call voting, it is assumed.4 Under this assump-
tion, treatment effects can be estimated among the subset of bills that reach a vote
regardless of treatment assignment.
Bill level outcomes include whether bills are amended and whether they are en-
acted into law. Every experimental bill that reached the floor became law, so esti-
mated effects of treatment on bill passage conflate several steps in the policymaking
process — passing committee, passing the lower chamber, passing the upper cham-
ber, and being signed by the governor — that we would want to examine separately
if not limited by the data.
4The technical assumption is that there are always attriters and never attriters. There are
no if-treated attriters or if-untreated attriters. The absence of roll call data can be thought of as
survival rather than attrition, but the assumptions remain the same.
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Compliance
The intervention faced unique and challenging forms of noncompliance. Most chal-
lenging was that some legislators did not attend caucus meetings. Absenteeism could
affect the experiment in several ways. The absence of a single legislator not only
makes it impossible for that legislator to receive treatment, but it also prevents that
legislator from administering treatment for the bill she sponsored. Absenteeism also
affects the definition of the subject population and the treatment itself. We would
like to estimate the impact of deliberation on legislators who attended the meetings
and on those who did not. The two groups receive very different treatments, but
there are reasons to expect deliberation might affect both. If attendance was revealed
post-treatment, we could not estimate heterogeneous effects by attendance.
The solution to this problem is surprisingly simple: legislators were informed
which bills had been selected for treatment only after meetings began. Legislators
were called upon, in random order, and asked to present on the (randomly selected)
bill. By construction, then, bill sponsors’ attendance could not be affected by treat-
ment assignment. As a result, the 20 bills proposed by the 7 absentee members can
be dropped from the study, and the estimands redefined with respect to the remain-
ing 25 bills sponsored by 9 attendees.5 Withholding notification about treatment
assignment also converts attendance from a post-treatment to a pre-treatment co-
variate. Treatment effects can be estimated separately for legislators who did and
5This design resembles a matched rollout protocol (Nickerson 2005). As long as treatment was
not attempted for any units in a block, in this case for any bills by a given sponsor, the block can
be dropped and the estimand redefined with respect to the remaining blocks. Rollout protocols
preserve large application rates, the percentage of units assigned to treatment that receive it, and
increase power compared to designs that retain blocks for which treatment was not attempted.
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did not attend the meetings.6
Dropping experimental bills diminishes power. The loss of 20 of the 45 bills
is particularly damaging for the estimation of the bill-level outcomes. The study
remains well-powered for estimating individual-level outcomes.
The risk of informing legislators of treatment assignment at the last minute is
that sponsors may not speak about the selected bill. This is the second form of non-
compliance. Table 4.1 displays treatment delivery by treatment assignment among
the final set of experimental bills. Seven of nine bills assigned to treatment were
discussed during the caucus meetings. Only one of sixteen bills assigned to control
was discussed.






Bills receiving treatment that were not included in
the study are omitted from this table.
The effect of assigning a bill to treatment on the probability that treatment
was delivered, the ITTd, is estimated by regressing treatment delivery on treatment
assignment at the bill level (Gerber and Green 2012). ÎTTd = 0.71 (ŜE = 0.16).
Attendees largely complied with treatment assignment. Because ÎTTd is relatively
6Contagion of information is possible, and even expected, between attendees and absentees,
which is why the latter group is relevant.
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large, all analyses below report intent-to-treat effects on the outcomes of interest.7 To
avoid the syntactic complications caused by noncompliance, the rest of the chapter
will refer to “treated bills” wherever the technically correct but more cumbersome
language of “bills assigned to treatment” is appropriate, and it will refer to “bills
assigned to control” as “untreated” or “control” bills.
Balance
Table 4.2 presents tests of covariate balance for the 25 experimental bills. Balance is
evaluated across the following bill-level covariates: fiscal cost; whether a fiscal review
was conducted of the bill; pre-treatment cosponsorship; and whether the bill’s senate
sponsor was a member of the same party as the house sponsor.8 Standard errors and
p-values are obtained through randomization inference.
Bills assigned to treatment have a higher fiscal cost, are more likely to have been
granted a fiscal score, and are less likely to have house and senate sponsors from
opposing parties. However, none of these differences reaches conventional levels of
statistical significance. An omnibus test examining whether the covariates jointly
predict treatment assignment generates an F-statistic of 124, which is still smaller
than 19% of statistics from simulated random assignments.
7Under the standard assumptions, estimated complier average causal effects are 42% larger than




8This legislature utilizes dual-track legislating which requires identical bills to be carried and
passed in each chamber.
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Table 4.2: Balance of deliberation assignment.
Treatment Assignment
Control Treatment Difference
Fiscal Cost ($ in mm) 0.2 32.9 32.6
(SE) (4.7) (15.5) (19.9)
Fiscal Review 0.437 0.720 0.283
(0.086) (0.160) (0.238)
Pre-treatment cosponsorship 0.035 0.027 −0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012)




Significance indicated at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗) two-sided. Stan-
dard errors and p-values obtained from randomization inference with 10,000
simulated treatment assignments.
External validity
Several aspects of the intervention make it particularly well-suited to finding large
effects of deliberation. Most importantly, the experimental universe of bills is not
representative of the broader policy agenda. Legislators selected bills that they
thought were appropriate for bipartisan discussion. They omitted highly partisan,
ideological proposals. Caucus meetings in state legislatures are low-profile proceed-
ings. Although technically open to the public, they are largely ignored by the press
and by activists. Partisanship may be muted in such settings compared to committee
hearings or floor debates, and personal relationships or social norms may be more
important. Only some legislators attended the caucus meetings, and they may differ
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from their peers. These characteristics may not apply to other legislative contexts,
most notably Congress.
Nevertheless, the context is largely representative of policymaking in state legisla-
tures and even in Congress. Many policy proposals receive some bipartisan support.
Caucuses are prevalent across American legislatures, and they are frequently bipar-
tisan, low-profile, and effective policymaking organizations.
Results
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 display legislators’ cosponsorship and roll call voting sup-
port for treated and control bills. The weighted average cosponsorship (roll call
voting) rate is displayed for in- and out-partisans, broken down by whether the indi-
vidual attended the caucus meeting. As is commonly the case, baseline cosponsorship
rates are low. Fewer than 10% of legislators cosponsored any given untreated bill.
Treated bills received more support than untreated bills, particularly among legis-
lators who attended the meetings. Out-party attendees were 28 percentage points
more likely to cosponsor treated bills than untreated bills, compared to an 8 percent-
age point difference for in-party attendees. Absentees were not substantially more
likely to cosponsor treated bills.9
Figure 4.3 displays estimated treatment effects on roll call voting. The dependent
variable is the weighted percentage of legislators who voted “Yes” on treated and
9See Appendix C.2 for estimated ITTs by group. Estimated ITTs for out-party attendees
are substantively large and unlikely to result from sampling variability (p < 0.10 one-sided with
standard errors clustered by bill). However, estimated effects for this group are not statistically
distinguishable from effects for the other groups.
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untreated legislation.10 In-partisans voted in favor of over 95% of both untreated
and treated bills. Out-partisans voted for 63% of untreated bills and 73% of treated
bills.
Estimated treatment effects and accompanying standard errors are obtained us-
ing weighted least squares regression. A model that compares cosponsorship (or
voting) on treated bills to untreated bills, conditional on the estimated ideology of
the subjects, is the following:
10Attendees and absentees are lumped in together, as fewer bills reached a vote.
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Yij = a+ b1dj + b2Ideologyij + uij (4.1)
where Yij indicates cosponsorship (roll call Yea vote) by legislator i on bill j, dj is
an indicator variable for whether bill j was assigned to treatment, and uij represents
unmeasured determinants of bill support. Weights equal the inverse of observations’
probability of assignment to their realized treatment conditions. The key parameter
of interest is b1, the average intent-to-treat effect of deliberation. Standard errors
and resulting p-values are clustered by bill.11
11While there are few clusters, twenty-five for the cosponsorship analysis and eight for the roll
call voting analysis, intra-cluster correlations are relatively low, avoiding some of the pathologies of
cluster-robust variance estimates (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004). Estimated standard
errors and p-values are verified by randomization inference.
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In order to improve the precision with which the parameter b1 is estimated, Equa-
tion 4.1 controls for a pre-treatment covariate that predicts the dependent variable.
Cosponsorship and roll call voting are strongly predicted by legislators’ ideological
predispositions (Poole 2005; Peress 2013). The variable Ideologyij measures the ideo-
logical distance between the subject i and the sponsor of bill j. Ideology is estimated
by applying the DW-NOMINATE scaling algorithm to prior session roll call votes.12
Estimated ITTs for in-partisans are small. Although only 9.6% of in-partisans
cosponsored the average untreated bill, deliberation increased cosponsorship by only
0.03 percentage points. The positive effect among in-party attendees is balanced out
by the negative effect among in-party absentees. Deliberation increased supportive
roll call voting by only 2 percentage points, although the high baseline rate of voting
support provides a ceiling for deliberation’s effects on this subgroup.
Estimated effects for out-partisans are much larger in magnitude. The ÎTT of
treatment on cosponsorship is 4.4 percentage points (p < 0.05 one-sided). This esti-
mate more than doubles the 3.9% baseline cosponsorship rate among out-partisans
and brings out-partisans’ cosponsorship nearly in line with in-partisans’. ÎTT on vot-
ing is 35.2 percentage points (p < 0.01 one-sided). This covariate-adjusted estimate
is much larger than the 10 percentage point unadjusted difference-in-means estimate
displayed in Figure 4.3, but it falls in line with previous experimental studies of roll
call voting (Bergan 2009; Butler and Nickerson 2011).13
12Three of the 99 legislators did not serve in the prior session. Their observations are assigned
an ideological distance of 999, and a second predictive covariate, “Invalid Ideological Distance” is
assigned a value of 1 for these legislators and 0 for all others. Table C.2 in Appendix C.2 shows
that ideological distance is strongly predictive of cosponsorship and roll call voting in this sample.
13Bergan (2009) estimates that legislators assigned to receive emails from a grassroots lobbying
campaign in favor of a smoke-free workplace bill were 8 to 14 percentage points more likely to vote
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Table 4.3: Estimated deliberation effects.
Cosponsorship Roll Call Voting
In-partisans Out-partisans In-partisans Out-partisans
YControl (%) 9.6 3.9 97.8 67.7
ÎTT (pp) 0.0 4.4∗∗ 2.0 35.2∗∗
(ŜE) (5.0) (2.5) (4.5) (12.6)
N 1,543 932 411 316
Clusters 25 25 8 8
ESS 165 189 83 44
Weights equal to inverse of bill’s probability of assignment to realized condition.
Significance indicated at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗) one-sided. SEs and
p-values are clustered at bill-level
Deliberation effected large gains in support from out-partisans, but only marginal
increases in support among in-partisans. As a result, the intervention substantially
reduced polarization in policy coalitions (see Appendix C.1).
Treatment effect heterogeneity
Why did deliberation increase bill support so much among out-partisans? Did spon-
sors talk down the ideological components of legislation and amplify the valence
components? Or did deliberation reduce informational asymmetries across the par-
ties? Examining heterogeneous treatment effects by legislators’ ideology speaks to
in favor of the bill than untreated legislators. Butler and Nickerson (2011) estimate some legislators




Figures 4.4 and 4.5 display cosponsorship and voting by legislators’ ideological
distance to bill sponsors.14 The dashed, green lines reflect subjects who are in the
same party as bill sponsors; the solid, red lines subjects in opposing parties. The
left panels indicate observations assigned to control, the right panels treatment.
Although ideological distance is, on average, larger between out-partisans, some out-
partisans are more ideologically-similar than some in-partisans.
Among out-partisans, bill support declines as distance increases. The relationship
between position-taking and ideology is modest for cosponsorship, but stronger for
roll call voting. The negative slopes indicate that ideology predicts position-taking.
The relationship is much weaker among in-partisans.
Beyond the negative slopes, the most striking feature from the figures is the large
intercept shifts between in-partisans and out-partisans. Among untreated observa-
tions for both cosponsorship and roll call voting, in-partisans are more likely than
out-partisans to support bills. This is true at any given ideological distance. Legis-
lators apply a “partisan penalty” in position-taking. Asymmetric information is one
of several possible explanations for this gap.
Deliberation reduced the partisan penalty by increasing average support among
out-partisans. There is little evidence that deliberation effects varied by ideology.15
These results are more consistent with deliberation reducing informational asymme-
14Although the ideal metric would measure the distance between legislators and bill proposals,
precisely estimating the ideological content of specific proposals is difficult (cf. Peress 2013).
15Appendix C.2 presents a regression analysis of heterogeneous effects by ideological distance.
There is limited evidence that deliberation increased the relationship between ideology and cospon-
sorship.
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Figure 4.4: Cosponsorship by deliberation assignment and ideology.
Control Treatment

















Figure 4.5: Roll call voting by deliberation assignment and ideology.
Control Treatment

















tries between parties than with persuading legislators to use non-ideological decision
making considerations.
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Policy consequences of deliberation
What were the consequences of deliberation on the disposition of proposals? Ta-
ble 4.4 presents estimated treatment effects on bill amendment and passage. ÎTTs
and ŜEs are obtained through weighted least squares regression and verified through
randomization inference. Table 4.4 also displays the weighted average amendment
and passage rates among control bills.
Table 4.4: Estimated deliberation effects on bill-level outcomes.
Amendments Filed Amendments Attached Passed
YControl 0.19 0.19 0.29
ÎTT −0.03 −0.11 −0.05
(ŜE) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18)
N 25 25 25
Significance indicated at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗) one-sided.
Weights equal to inverse of bill’s probability of assignment to realized condition.
There is little evidence that treatment affects bill amendment or passage. In
fact, ITT estimates for both outcomes are in the opposite direction of predictions.
Deliberation reduced the number of amendments filed per bill from 0.19 to 0.16 and
the number of amendments adopted from 0.19 to 0.08.16 Deliberation reduced the
probability of bill passage by 5 percentage points. Low power and large standard
errors limit the usefulness of these estimates. Nevertheless, they do not suggest that
treatment significantly affected whether bills received a roll call vote.
16Three of the four bills received 1 filed amendment; the fourth received 2. Results do not change
substantially if we define amendment as whether a bill received any amendment.
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4.3 The limits of deliberation
Deliberation fails if it does not lead policymakers toward more-informed positions
(Landy, Roberts, and Thomas 1990; Lascher Jr. 1996; Mucciaroni and Quirk 2006).
Because it is difficult to obtain legislators’ positions under different information envi-
ronments, previous studies indirectly infer deliberative failures. For example, previ-
ous works have judged the 1981 Reagan tax cuts as a failure of deliberation because
they did not pay for themselves, nor did the 1992 deregulation of the cable industry
lead to lower cable fees for consumers as promised. The large investment in the
Yucca mountain national nuclear waste repository must be a deliberative failure as
it may never be used (Jacob 1990; Quirk 2005). The experimental approach in this
paper compares legislators’ positions with and without deliberation. It provides clear
causal evidence that standard deliberative processes fail, at least some of the time.
Did the supplementary caucus deliberation guide legislators to their fully-informed
positions? A case study of one bill suggests that it did not. An unexpected pressure
campaign from unhappy constituents made it clear that legislators were unaware of
an important political calculation. For this bill, the failure of deliberation incurred
costs in terms of legislators’ popularity and lost plenary time.
A first-term Democratic legislator in the minority party sponsored a bill to update
the state’s child safety seat law. It would have required parents to use booster seats
for children up to twelve years of age. Although not an experimental bill, the sponsor
did discuss the bill at a caucus meeting and receive a cosponsor from a Republican
BFC member in attendance. The bill passed through committees in the House and
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Senate either with unanimous support or by voice vote, passed the senate floor
unanimously, and passed the house floor with two-thirds of members supporting it,
including a majority of Republicans.
As the bill awaited the governor’s signature, Tea Party activists criticized the
bill’s expansion of government regulation and imposition of potentially costly re-
quirements. Amplified by conservative radio and social media, the public outcry led
state legislators to recall the bill from the governor, re-refer it to committee, and kill
it, with now two-thirds of members in the house, and nearly all Republicans, in op-
position. The Republican member of the BFC withdrew his cosponsorship. Caucus
deliberation had failed to raise the important consideration that Tea Party activists
might oppose a bill that created new regulations on parenting. It also failed the
legislature as a whole by squandering scarce plenary time.
What can we learn from this case study? Unsurprisingly, caucus deliberation
does not cure all of the pathologies of ineffective committee and floor debate. The
case also shows that bill sponsors may have trouble anticipating relevant political
considerations for out-partisans. Nevertheless, deliberation was, initially, effective
across parties. Republicans agreed with the sponsor’s position. Only after it became
apparent they had ignored the interests of a vocal constituency did Republicans
change their positions. They also punished the sponsor. They withdrew cosponsor-
ships of his other bills; re-referred them to committee; and challenged any legislation
he attempted to pass on the consent calendar. In the repeated game of legislating,
communication is possible between dissimilar legislators, but mistakes or misleading
communication is punished.
95
4.4 Discussion of deliberation’s effectiveness
This study makes several contributions to the field of legislative deliberation. First,
legislators do change their minds as a result of talking with peers. Second, infor-
mative communication can occur between dissimilar legislators. Third, a legislative
caucus can foster information-sharing despite lacking formal parliamentary powers
such as gatekeeping power. Finally, legislators’ bipartisan efforts are limited by pres-
sure from vocal partisan extremists.
Deliberation is still possible in today’s highly partisan legislatures, but we may
have been looking in the wrong places. Committees and floor debates, historically
the focus of scholars’ attention, have become arenas for partisan bickering and point-
scoring. Bipartisan caucuses, on the other hand, typically operate without much
public attention or oversight from party leaders. The freedom to discuss policy
outside the formal policymaking process may be central to caucuses’ effectiveness.
This study provides more evidence that legislators’ positions are contextual.
Position-taking is not only a function of the ideology that legislators bring into the
legislature. Activities within the legislature also shape legislators’ positions. While
activities inside the legislature have been overlooked too often in legislative studies
(Lee 2009), this paper suggests one approach that is well-suited to studying them:
conducting randomized control trials, under the guidance of legislative leaders, to




“You can grumble all you want about those idiots in the Congress.
But if you’re not helping to educate the idiots, you’re not doing your
job.”
— Dr. Vernon Ehlers, physicist, professor, and U.S. Representative
(1993 – 2011) (via Slotnik 2017).
Contemporary American legislatures are broken. In addition to gridlock and
polarization, legislators face a steady deterioration of the institutions, behaviors, and
norms that support informed lawmaking. Legislatures have fewer policy staff, less
committee expertise, and more leader-driven policymaking than they did fifty years
ago.1 As a result, American legislatures today resemble less the textbook Congress of
1The decline of the seniority system has reduced incentives for legislators to invest in special-
ized expertise and has centralized policymaking in the majority party leadership (Sinclair 1989).
Members of Congress have shifted many of their staff members to district offices, and what staff
remains in Washington deals more with communications than policy (Sunlight Foundation 2010;
Lee 2016). Members of Congress spend less time in Washington than they used to, and in some
states legislators are barred from long-term service through term limits (Rosenthal 1998).
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the post-WWII era than American legislatures in the Progressive and New Deal eras.
Unfortunately, these earlier legislatures were widely viewed as incompetent (Rocca
1921).2 Contemporary legislatures receive similarly dismal reviews. Legislators vote
for bills that contain substantial “errors and ambiguities” (Tankersley and Rappeport
2018), and, in some cases, they confuse which bill they are voting on in the first
place (Seipel 2018). Legislators themselves complain that the policymaking process
is broken (Tester 2017; McCain 2017).
What should legislative scholars do about the current state of policymaking?
In the past, when legislatures struggled, political scientists advocated for reforms.
From the Progressive Era to the 1970s, scholars recommended changing legislative
procedures and institutions. They advocated for more staff, better salaries, stronger
committees, and new legislative research bureaus. The goal was to ensure legislation
was based on an expert understanding of public policy. Together, these reforms laid
the foundation for evidence-based policymaking.3 These reforms were, by and large,
successful.4 But the reforms, and the legislative competence they effected, did not
last.
It is tempting to blame partisans for the decline in legislative competence over the
past few decades, but scholars also bear responsibility. Political scientists advocated
for a more rigorous and empirical policymaking process, but we did not conduct
2Lawmakers and parliamentarians themselves noted that public policy was riddled with errors,
reflected a dearth of policy expertise, and was often made in a rush at the end of legislative sessions
(Ilbert 1901; O’Neal 1914; Luce 1924; Mason 1938; Massachusetts (State) 1943; New York (State)
1946; Galloway 1951).
3This phrase was popularized in the 1990s but the concept is much older.
4In 1980, Alan Rosenthal wrote that “No longer a relic of the past, the legislature has built up
capacity and become heavily involved in the governance of the state” (Rosenthal 1981, 340).
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rigorous and empirical evaluations of the reforms we recommended. This was a great
opportunity missed. As a result, there is little clear, causal evidence linking many
legislative processes to outcomes that matter to legislators and voters.
I believe that scholars should work with stakeholders to evaluate legislative pro-
cedures. Evaluation differs from the vast existing empirical literature on legislatures
in an important way. Causal identification is paramount. Cross-sectional and time
series studies that lack clear identification strategies require strong assumptions to
determine the impact of legislative features. Instead, evaluation focuses on cases
where legislative operations change, in particular when they change independently
of other confounding factors. Evaluation recommends experimentation.
This research program requires a proactive engagement with legislative affairs.
The researcher is not in a position to change legislative operations herself5 (although
she may suggest topics to be studied), but she will be working alongside legislators
and staff who are changing the way the legislature operates. The researcher’s role is
to design evaluation programs so any reforms can be studied. This participatory role
may make some legislative scholars uncomfortable. However, a look at the history
of our discipline shows that scholars have often intervened to shape legislatures.
5Unlike studies of representation in which the researcher can randomly provide information
about constituents to legislators, such as voters’ policy preferences or appeals for government ser-
vices, the researcher of policymaking processes cannot, without legislators’ support, change insti-
tutions or behaviors inside the legislature.
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5.1 Political scientists have shaped modern legislatures
The development of modern legislatures has been marked at each stage by an ac-
tivist and influential community of legislative scholars. The Constitution laid out
the powers of Congress but made no explicit provision6 to ensure they were wielded
effectively. The founders thought the informational challenges of lawmaking would
subside as the new federal government matured.7 Across the Atlantic, Jeremy Ben-
tham also thought that concerns about legislators’ “intellectual aptitude [and] active
talent” (Bentham 1817, 254) would resolve themselves naturally. Aptitude would
be revealed through parliamentary debates, and the public, in its wisdom, would
recognize and vote out incompetent lawmakers. Other than elections, no legislative
institution was adopted in the Constitution to ensure informed policymaking.
The growing complexity of government during the Second Industrial Revolution8
belied optimism about legislative competence. John Stuart Mill characterized mem-
bers of Parliament as “inexperience sitting in judgment on experience, ignorance on
knowledge” (Mill 1865, 93). Lord Bryce described the “keen, though limited, in-
6Deliberations in the Constitutional Convention suggest age requirements for legislators seemed
largely to follow from the British custom. In Federalist 62, Madison does discuss a limited concern
for competence, arguing that the Senate’s deliberative nature required a “greater extent of infor-
mation and stability of character” (Madison 1788) among its members than those in the House.
7“No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and a sound
judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate.... It is true that
all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the
proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements
on the first draughts will every year become both easier and fewer.” (Federalist 53).
8Why informational challenges became so severe during this period, the Gilded Age in America,
is an interesting question, but beyond the scope of this essay. I would conjecture that the growth of
newspapers, the proliferation of the telegraph, and the consolidation of railroads led to an explosion
in the exchange of ideas, of trade, and of the demands placed on lawmakers.
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telligence” (1906, 65) of American legislators. Courtenay Ilbert noted that modern
legislating “usually requires more expert knowledge than a private member of Par-
liament can command” and that the many technical questions “beset and baffle the
private member in his attempts at legislation”(Ilbert 1901, 216-217). To remedy this
ignorance, Mill advocated a reform to the policymaking process. Elected representa-
tives should be allowed to sanction policy proposals drafted by expert commissions
but not draft their own bills.9 Although this astonishing suggestion was not strictly
adopted, the concept of delegation would become central to theories of effective leg-
islative policymaking.
Progressive Era political scientists took a far more active and democratically-
minded approach to improving the scientific foundation of legislation. They ad-
dressed the process by which legislation was drafted and its content determined.
One early reform was the adoption of bill-drafting bureaus (Jones 1952).10 Legis-
lators and their clerks had been responsible for writing their own legislation, with
frequently unfortunate results.11 New bill drafting bureaus were staffed with lawyers
whose sole responsibility was to write legislation. In Colorado and Washington, these
bureaus were even set up within the state universities (Cleland 1914). Lawyers were
hired to review legislation before it was signed by the Governor and to revise existing
statutes to resolve inconsistencies. These changes sought well-crafted legislation that
was consistent with current law and free of drafting errors.
9Mill probably had in mind commissions like those used to reform the Poor Laws and the
London Sewer system. In an odd twist of history, both commissions included Edwin Chadwick,
once Bentham’s personal secretary, as a driving intellectual influence.
10The first regular bill-drafting bureau was adopted in Parliament in 1869.
11For one example, Charles McCarthy refers to “jokers” in legislation prior to the adoption of
rules for professionalized bill drafting (McCarthy 1912, 197).
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Progressives also thought the substance of legislation should rest on expert knowl-
edge. The first modern legislative reference bureau, created in Wisconsin by Charles
McCarthy,12 ensured that a legislator could request expert legal or financial advice
on any topic of legislation.13 Policy research was to be impartial and scientific. The
purpose of the reference bureau was not to endorse policy proposals, but to make
sure any proposal could be drafted and evaluated with the guidance of experts. Bill
drafting bureaus and legislative reference libraries spread throughout American leg-
islatures.14
The New Deal Era raised new fears about executive dominance, which led political
scientists to devise new legislative institutions. One such institution was the legisla-
tive council, a group of legislators who would engage in long-term policy planning
even when the legislature was not in session (Rhodes 1946; Davey 1953). Political
scientists recommended other reforms such as removing constitutional limits on leg-
islative pay to make public service a more attractive career (APSA 1945; Lederle
1947). They also argued for a rationalization of the committee system in Congress
12McCarthy, a PhD in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin, explained the infor-
mational problems legislators face and the role of the researcher in helping: “The legislator is a
busy man; he has no time to read. His work is new to him; he is beset with routine.... If he does
not investigate for himself, he often is deceived by those who are seeking the accomplishment of
their own selfish ends. Therefore, we can be of the greatest service to him, if we index, digest and
make as clear as possible all kinds of information.” (McCarthy 1912, 215).
13McCarthy thought it was the responsibility of experts to support legislators: “We have heard
a great deal of condemnation of the legislature. It is easy and popular too, to sneer, censure,
and criticize — but we have heard very few suggestions as to a remedy.... If it is difficult to get
information because of the great variety of subjects now coming before our legislators, the only
sensible thing to do is to have experts gather this material.” (McCarthy 1912, 223).
14During the 1910s, the House and Senate in Congress each had one lawyer to draft legislation
(Luce 1922). By the 1940s, the Office of the Legislative Counsel had expanded, although still only
to a total of 14 staffers (APSA 1945). The Library of Congress established its Legislative Reference
Service in 1914, but Congress only made it a free-standing support organization with the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946.
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and state legislatures (APSA 1945; New York (State) 1946). Again, these reforms
were widely adopted.
Academics were recommending fundamental changes to how legislatures oper-
ated. This activism was broadly sanctioned and supported by the discipline’s pro-
fessional organizations. The American Academy of Political and Social Science was
founded in 1889 to bring social science to bear on public policy issues.15 The AAPSS,
through book publishing and its in-house journal, frequently recommended legisla-
tive reforms (Mason 1938; Treadway 1938).16 The AAPSS continues to publish, and
new organizations have been established to facilitate political scientists’ influence on
public policy.17
The leading professional association of political scientists has joined the fray. In
1941, the American Political Science Association convened a special committee on
the organization of Congress. Working closely with the La Follette-Monroney com-
mittee on legislative reorganization, the APSA committee recommended increased
staffing, a simplified committee system, and registration requirements for lobby-
ists. These reforms were adopted in the landmark Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946. Political scientists also guided the reorganization of state legislatures. Mas-
sachusetts’ legislative reorganization committee included Daniel Marsh, President of
15Its mission was to “synthesize and advance research that addressed social challenges that might
be redressed with more effective policy” (AAPSS 2018).
16The Academy published books identifying problems with state legislatures and city councils
(with titles including “Decay of State and Local Government” (1890), “Our Failures in Municipal
Government” (1893), and “A Problem of Primaries” (1906)), and proposing solutions (see “Reform
of Our State Governments” (1894) and “Modernizing our State legislatures” (1936) (AAPSS 1908;
Buck 1936)).
17The Scholars Strategy Network aims to “improve public policy and strengthen democracy by
connecting scholars and their research to policymakers, citizen associations, and the media” (SSN
2018).
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Boston University, and A. Chester Hanford, Professor of Government and Dean of
Harvard College (Massachusetts (State) 1943).
The 1970s saw the apex of state legislatures’ lawmaking capacity, a development
widely credited to Alan Rosenthal. Over his career, Rosenthal consulted with at
least 35 state legislatures on their organization. His 1968 study of the Connecticut
legislature illustrates the scope of his impact. He recommended switching from bien-
nial to annual sessions, creating nonpartisan offices of legislative research and fiscal
analysis, establishing offices for party caucus staff, and tripling legislators’ salaries.18
All of these recommendations, and more, were adopted. Rosenthal was also central
to the founding of the National Conference of State Legislatures, and his seminars
for legislators and staff shaped a generation of legislative leaders.
Anywhere we look in a contemporary legislature — at staff, committees, reference
bureaus, bill drafting bureaus, legislative councils, party caucuses, and lobbying rules
— we see the influence of political scientists. The informational resources available to
contemporary legislators emerged from legislative studies and were adopted because
of academics’ advocacy. It is hard to imagine contemporary legislatures if political
scientists who perceived a problem with legislative performance had not suggested
solutions.
5.2 Improving legislatures is the academics’ responsibility
The provision of policy expertise is subject to a collective action problem. Only
groups with specialized interests or means of overcoming these problems will incur
18This is presumably only one reason Dr. Rosenthal was so well-liked by legislators.
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the costs of informing policymakers. To the progressives, this informational advan-
tage was a source of moneyed interests’ influence over policy.19 Progressives looked
for nonpartisan experts in public policy to balance the scales. They found aca-
demics. Not only were academics nonpartisan experts with a commitment to the
public interest, but many were already being compensated with public funds!20
Academia has long claimed a responsibility to engage with problems of public
affairs.21 This responsibility continues in the mission of American universities even
today. In 2017, Columbia University President Lee Bollinger announced a new ini-
tiative, Columbia World Projects, to bring academic research to bear on matters of
global importance. He identified one such problem as “the capacity of liberal demo-
cratic institutions to identify and deal with significant policy concerns” (Bollinger
2017). What institution is more central to democracies than legislatures?
There has been criticism of activist scholars. The central objection is that aca-
demics should not engage in politics. In the past, professors who offered their exper-
tise to lawmakers were “censured as endangering the life of the university — accused
of throwing it into politics” (McCarthy 1912, 137). Many progressive scholars went
beyond studying legislative operations to endorsing specific policies,22 which did in-
19“Is it better to allow such irresponsible parties [as the trusts] to have the power of fixing
rates and prices rather than the state? Is it better to permit them to make laws than the state?”
(McCarthy 1912, 17).
20This led McCarthy (1912, 13) to ask “Why should the public not avail itself of their services?”
21This idea was expressed in the Progressive Era as The Wisconsin Idea, the notion that faculty
experts should work with legislators on ground-breaking legislation (McCarthy 1912; Turner 1921).
The Wisconsin Idea lives on, though it is threatened in, of all places, Wisconsin, where Governor
Scott Walker sought to remove the idea from the University of Wisconsin’s mission statement in
2015 before backing down.
22These positions included breaking up the trusts, regulating railroads, enacting labor regula-
tions, and reducing the power of party bosses.
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deed court partisan conflict. Today, we are accustomed to academics being criticized
for their support of partisan policy positions. Again, there is good reason. I have
been present in committee hearings where legislative supporters of a policy invite
their expert academics, opponents invite their expert academics, and the only con-
crete result is that academia looks partisan and uncertain.
Informed policymaking, though, has been a nonpartisan issue of procedure, rather
than a partisan issue of policy outcomes, for at least a hundred years. Henry Emery,
a professor of political economy at Yale when he was named chairman of the Na-
tional Tariff Commission in 1909, believed that expertise could be nonpartisan even
on highly partisan issues.23 The academic’s role was to provide expertise regardless of
which direction policy was moving. Even a tariff opponent would prefer tariffs to be
efficiently and fairly imposed. Alan Rosenthal was widely respected by Republicans
and Democrats alike because they understood his advice related to the operations
of the legislature and not its outputs. Many legislative reformers have been par-
liamentarians who, by their position, eschew partiality but protect the legislature’s
reputation for competence (Ilbert 1901; Mason 1938; Galloway 1951).24
This nonpartisan concern for legislative efficiency has been acknowledged by leg-
islators themselves. Members of the New York Joint Committee on Legislative Meth-
ods declared there “is a nonpartisan interest in efficient policy deliberation” (New
York (State) 1946, 17). Members of the Massachusetts Special Commission on Leg-
23“It is a common belief that in a matter of such political significance as the tariff, non-
partisanship is impossible. In my opinion this belief is unduly cynical and pessimistic.” (Emery
1912, 25).
24“As a member of the staff of the Library of Congress, I view the legislative scene with as much
nonaxiological detachment as an anthropologist would describe the customs and mores of primitive
tribes on some tropical island.” (Galloway 1951 , 41).
106
islative System and Procedure asserted that the public is entitled to demand their
representatives have “capacity to enact accurate and effective legislation based on
reliable research” (Massachusetts (State) 1943, 11). Recognizing their common prob-
lems, legislators have welcomed help from impartial political scientists.
Despite this impartial focus on legislative procedures, there remain legitimate
questions about whether academics should impact public policies. Even if they are
not doing so directly, academics may influence policy by improving procedure. Ef-
ficient procedures may help legislators pass bills, the thinking goes, but they may
help legislators pass the wrong bills.25 Pathologies and biases in representation are
real, and the extent to which policy outputs reflect the interests of different social
groups is important.
However, concerns about policy outcomes do not outweigh concerns about leg-
islative procedures. Informational efficiency and policy representation are distinct
concerns,26 and we should not ignore the former out of fear of the latter. Poor rep-
resentation and bad policymaking may well occur, but withholding expertise seems
a poor response. Starving legislatures of information and efficient institutions will
make all legislating harder, especially for bills in the public interest. If we grant that
procedural problems are legitimately costly — and there are ample such accounts by
journalists, academics, and legislators — we cannot accept them out of an absolutist
aversion to influencing policy outcomes.
Normative questions notwithstanding, political scientists, economists, and public
25However one chooses to define “wrong” legislation, academics’ influence only becomes prob-
lematic if it leads to undesirable outcomes.
26See Federalist 62 (Madison 1788) and Mill (1862) for two takes on this dichotomy of problems
facing the representative legislature.
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health experts have long claimed a role in public policy. Advocacy for specific health
or economics policies is broadly supported, perhaps because the problems are so
visible. Public health epidemics and unemployment hit close to home. The problems
facing legislatures are more distant, but they are no less real. The legislative scholar
who identifies a cost of ineffective procedure is just as responsible for addressing it
as is an economist, public health expert, or criminologist who discovers a problem in
their field.
The more robust criticism, it seems to me, is not that previous efforts to improve
legislative operations changed policy outcomes in a negative way; it is that we have
little evidence that they changed any outcomes at all. The irony of the movement
for evidence-based policymaking is that political scientists failed to collect evidence
about the effectiveness of evidence-based policymaking.27 It is unclear how well
institutional reforms solved the legislature’s problems or if they caused new problems
of their own.
Earlier reorganizations were based on the best guidance political scientists had
to offer, but reformers were strikingly confident. Reference bureaus, staff changes,
and committee reforms were not rolled out gradually. They were implemented all at
once, universally, on a permanent basis.28 In a way, they were implemented in the
same way as most public policies: with a sharp discontinuity and no plan to judge
whether the new regime actually worked better than the old.
The flaws of this stark approach led to the current popularity of evidence-based
27Contrast the vast empirical literature on term limits, a legislative reform generally opposed by
political scientists, with the lack of studies on earlier informational reforms.
28This does not mean that reforms were binding on the legislature in perpetuity, just that they
were not intended to expire.
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policymaking. Part of its logic is that policymaking is an ongoing enterprise, and
there should be continued efforts to evaluate and improve policy. Where are the
ongoing efforts to evaluate and improve legislative institutions?
5.3 A research program of legislative evaluation
The purpose of legislative evaluation is to identify the causal effect of specific legisla-
tive institutions, rules, and activities on outcomes of interest. Prior legislative evalu-
ations have utilized a variety of causal identification strategies. Naturally-occurring
experiments provide leverage for studying the effects of term length on legislative
entrepreneurship (Titiunik 2016) and of office location on position-taking (Rogowski
and Sinclair 2012).29 Non-randomized observational designs can identify causal ef-
fects subject to the validity of their assumptions. Berry and Fowler (2016) use a
difference-in-difference design that assumes parallel trends across legislators to esti-
mate the effect of committee chairmanships on pork spending. Phillips and Kirkland
(2017) use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of divided
government on the passage of state budgets. These works share a careful consider-
ation of the measurement and identification challenges that make estimating causal
effects so difficult.
Naturally-occurring experiments and well-identified observational designs face
clear limits. Academics are searching for any historical randomization that applies
29These two studies engage with long-standing questions about legislative organization. The
Federalist Papers considered many arguments about the effects of term length on legislative behav-
ior, and effects of the architectural design of parliaments on political outcomes have been studied
since at least Ilbert.
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to politics, but at some point we will run out. Further, not every institution was
adopted in a way that facilitates the identification of causal effects. These designs
only work for rules or institutions that already exist. If a legislative leader wants
to enact a rule that has not been widely adopted, how does the legislative scholar
predict its effectiveness?
The obvious answer, in my view, is to work with the leader to design a study
to evaluate the proposed rule change. Often this will recommend experimentation.
Experiments have been widely adopted in political science. Even politicians have
welcomed experiments to evaluate their campaign strategies and the effectiveness
of public policies. Experiments have also been used to study interactions between
legislators and the public. The next step is to use experiments to study operations
inside the legislature.
Experimental evaluations must be conducted alongside legislators and their staff
for practical and ethical reasons. Any experimental study faces a common set of
ethical concerns about respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. Working under
legislators’ guidance ensures legislators are informed about the research activity, can
object to any potentially harmful intervention, and will benefit from the findings. I
have found legislators are quick to understand the logic of experimentation, and they
are deeply curious about the effectiveness of legislative procedures. They welcome
experimental projects that are responsibly, impartially, and carefully conducted.
Legislative evaluation does not just benefit legislative stakeholders and our pub-
lic policy. It offers a way forward for students of legislatures who feel, as I do, that
empiricists have been unable to address many essential questions posed by theories
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of legislative organization. How effectively do committees solve commitment, coor-
dination, and collective action problems? Do legislative institutions cause partisan
polarization? Are there procedural solutions to gridlock? Across these foundational
topics, theory has outpaced empirics. The only way we can convincingly answer
them is to better understand the causal relationships between legislative processes
and outcomes.
Evaluation is better suited to some research questions than others. Information
is particularly conducive to experimental study. Information is central to theories
of legislatures, and it happens to be particularly difficult to measure observation-
ally. As a result, there are many unanswered questions of practical and theoretical
significance. Evaluation studies of information can examine the impact of commit-
tee research reports, party caucuses, floor debate, and fiscal estimates on individual
position-taking and policy outcomes.
Beyond information, coordination and collective action problems could be studied
without much difficulty. Coordination could be examined through Dear Colleague
letters and collective action problems through the selection of parliamentary leaders.
Legislatures feature a long list of relatively low-rank leadership positions, including
regional whips, delegation leaders, class representatives, and caucus chairs. Do these
positions encourage legislating in the collective interest? Issues surrounding parti-
sanship might raise problems for an impartial researcher, but some topics are still
suitable for study. For example, do party caucus meetings affect polarization? Do
legislators support interventions to facilitate bipartisanship?
Some topics are also easier to evaluate than others from a research design perspec-
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tive. Activities like lobbying and deliberation can be experimentally manipulated for
each legislator across a range of bills. Many rules are assigned at the bill level, while
committee appointments are made at the legislator level. Institutions generally ap-
ply to all legislators and bills for a given session. As these clusters of experimental
units grow larger and larger, researchers will have to develop more creative strategies
for well-powered evaluations. Designs may have to include multiple legislatures or
collect highly prognostic pre-treatment covariates.
This research program will be effective if it generates sustained interest in im-
proving legislative procedures. Writing after World War II, congressional historian
George Galloway laid out the stakes for the failure of American legislatures:
“Representative government has broken down or disappeared in other
countries. Here in the United States it remains on trial. Its survival may
well depend upon its ability to cope quickly and adequately with the dif-
ficult problems of a dangerous world. Congress is the central citadel of
American democracy and our chief defense against dictatorship. Hence
the importance of congressional reorganization and of further steps to-
ward strengthening our national legislature.” (Galloway 1951, 68).
Legislative reform movements in the past have been intermittent and their successes
impermanent. As a result, American legislatures have, from time to time, lapsed
into dysfunction. They are too important for this to happen. In 2018, the challenges
facing our legislatures might be different, but they once again call out for reme-
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A.1 Why information influences position-taking
Why does information affect legislators’ policy positions, and why might informa-
tion’s effects vary across legislators? This section describes a simple model of decision
making under uncertainty in which legislators’ prior uncertainty about the connec-
tion between policy instruments and policy outcomes constrains position-taking.
Assume legislators are risk averse and policy oriented. The utility legislator i
receives from policy xp can be given by the following utility function:
ui(x) = −(xp − xi)2
where xi is the legislator’s ideal policy outcome; xp, the policy’s ideological con-
tent, may not be known with certainty. Suppose legislators’ prior beliefs are that xp
is uniformly distributed in [0,1] (with mean x¯p) and that the prior distribution of xp
is fully contained within the support for the distribution of legislator ideal points.
Legislators’ prior, uninformed expected utility from a bill, given by integrating
over their utility function, is the following:
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E[ui(xp)] = −(x¯p − xi)2 − V ar(xp)
Utility is decreasing in ideological distance between the legislator and their ex-
pectation about the policy’s content. V ar(xp) represents the costs of uncertainty.
Suppose legislators support a bill if their utility exceeds a critical threshold, u∗
(Peress 2013).1 Support could mean voting for the bill or choosing to cosponsor it.
The legislator’s probability of supporting the bill can be given by a random utility
choice model that allows bill support to be increasing in utility with a particularly
large increase when utility approaches the threshold:
Pr(Support = 1) =
1
1 + e−u∗+βE[u(xp)]
In this framework, information can influence support via utility in two ways. It
can reduce uncertainty (V ar(xp)) or correct a prior expectation (x¯p).
1This threshold could also be the utility from a status quo policy.
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A.2 Placebo tests for non-experimental analyses
Figure 2.1 shows that cosponsorship of veterans bills declined substantially following
the closure of the joint veterans committee. The stark changes on veterans legislation
are not observed on other issues. Figure A.1 shows cosponsorship of all bills excluding
veterans legislation.
House Senate






















Joint Veterans Committee Member Member (Former) Not on committee
Figure A.1: Non-veterans bills cosponsored per legislator.
Figure A.2 shows that legislators from districts with a large percentage of veterans
are uniquely engaged with veterans issues. They do not cosponsor non-veterans
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legislation at higher rates.
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To ease interpretation, ÂTE estimates from logistic regression are presented as the
difference in the predicted probabilities of cosponsorship due to treatment. For the
same reason, logistic standard errors are converted to predicted probabilities by
taking the difference in predicted probability of cosponsorship of a one standard
error change in the estimated average treatment effect, centered at the estimated
value.








(a) Bill and legislator fixed effects.
Logistic regression estimates converted to predicted probabilities.
Robust standard errors and p-values presented.
One-tailed p-values indicated at p < .05 (*), p < .01 (**).
Figure A.3 displays legislator-specific difference-in-means ÂTE and statistical sig-
nificance (p-values from Fisher’s exact test and verified with randomization infer-
ence). There are no negative, statistically significant ÂTE for individual legislators.
Due to the small number of bills per legislator, ÂTE must be quite large (c. 50
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pp) to attain conventional levels of statistical significance. Observations are jittered




















Legislator Specific Treatment Effects
Figure A.3: Estimated statistical significance of legislator-specific briefing effects.
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Appendix B: Cue-taking
B.1 Construction of alternative cue-taking models
Video of floor proceedings was used to create a seating plan for all 99 legislators
in the lower chamber. Of the 157 subjects in the two experiments (with subjects
defined as a legislator in a given study, since seating plans change), 132 shared a
desk with a legislator who was also included in the study. A legislator is defined as
exposed to secondary treatment if her deskmate was assigned to the bill briefing.
Each subject was matched to another subject in a neighboring district to create
pairs of geographically proximate legislators. Subjects were grouped into pairs and
not larger groups to maintain parallelism with other diffusion models and to prevent
the possibility of subjects being exposed to multiple spillover treatments. Distance
is calculated by the latitude and longitude of districts’ municipal seats. Pairs were
created through an algorithm that minimized the aggregate distance within pairs.
DW-NOMINATE ideology scores were constructed based on legislators’ roll call
voting during the first session.1 Legislators were paired based on their first and
1Using roll call voting from the session during which Study 1 was implemented maximizes the
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second dimension ideology scores, again through an algorithm that minimized the
aggregate distance within pairs.2
The spillover models are not aggregated into one complex model and estimated
jointly due to the large number of treatment conditions that would result.
number of legislators with valid ideology scores. This covariate is post-treatment for Study 1 and
pre-treatment for Study 2. There is little reason to think treatment on the limited number of bills
in these studies, many of which did not receive a vote, influenced legislators’ DW-NOMINATE
scores.
2Bowers, Frederickson, and Panagopoulos (2012) and Coppock (2014) utilize more complex
models of treatment spillover across ideology networks. This simple two-person model is used to
maintain parallelism with the other models.
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B.2 Supplemental results
Table B.1: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects (study 2 only).
(1) (2)
Staff
Briefing ÎTT 16.7 4.4
(ŜE) (4.8) (3.7)
Cue-taking ÎTT 18.0 6.4
(4.4) (3.0)
Advocate
Briefing ÎTT 1.4 0.7
(4.9) (3.6)





Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization
inference and 10,000 simulated assignments.
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Table B.2: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects excluding legislator fixed
effects.
Briefing Cue-taking Combined
TS=0 ST=0 TS=1 + ST=1
ÎTT 5.3 3.6 12.1
(ŜE) (1.9) (1.7) (2.9)
p̂ (one-tailed) 0.004 0.013 0.000
N 2,080 2,080 2,080
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization infer-
ence and 10,000 simulated assignments.
Observations assigned to advocate direct or secondary treatment
(200) or multiple staffer secondary treatments (36) are not dis-
played.
Estimated probability of combined effects smaller or equal to sum
of direct and indirect effects is 4.1%.
Table B.3: Estimated briefing and cue-taking effects excluding legislator fixed
effects (study 1 only).
Briefing Cue-taking Combined
TS=0 ST=0 TS=1 + ST=1
ÎTT 4.3 0.0 10.5
(ŜE) (2.2) (1.9) (2.9)
p̂ (one-tailed) 0.024 0.487 0.000
N 1,088 1,088 1,088
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization infer-
ence and 10,000 simulated assignments.
Observations assigned to multiple staffer secondary treatments
(36) are not displayed.
Estimated probability of combined effects smaller or equal to sum
of direct and indirect effects is 13.2%.
139
Table B.4: Estimated briefing effects in one-person offices.
Study 1 Study 2 Combined
Briefing ÎTT −5.3 5.7 1.1
(ŜE) (5.2) (6.4) (4.7)
p̂ (one-tailed) 0.840 0.179 0.397
N 128 304 432
Standard errors and p-values obtained using randomization
inference and 10,000 simulated assignments.
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Appendix C: Deliberation
C.1 Deliberation and polarization of position-taking
Deliberation substantially reduced polarization in policy coalitions. Figure C.1 plots
the predicted probability of cosponsorship (y-axis) against the ideology of legisla-
tors (x-axis) for bills sponsored by Democrats (solid, blue lines) and Republicans
(dotted, red lines).1 In the left-hand panel, which includes untreated observations,
there is clear partisan polarization. Democratic bills are cosponsored by legislators
with left-of-center ideologies and Republican bills by legislators right-of-center. In-
party cosponsorship is on the order of ten times as large as out-party cosponsorship.
There is minimal cross party cosponsorship. In the right-hand panel, bills assigned
to deliberation demonstrate far less polarization in support. Liberals cosponsor Re-
publican bills at nearly the same rate as conservatives and vice versa. The curves
are bimodal, not unimodal. Similar, but muted, patterns are also evident in roll call
voting in Figure C.2.
1The three legislators who did not serve in the prior session of the given assembly are omitted
from the display.
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Figure C.1: Deliberation and cosponsorship polarization.
Control Treatment


















Figure C.2: Deliberation and roll call voting polarization.
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Estimated deliberation effects by attendance and partisanship
Table C.1: Estimated deliberation effects by attendance and partisanship.
Attendees Absentees
In-Party Out-Party In-Party Out-Party
ÎTT 0.08 0.28∗ −0.01 0.03
(SE) (0.06) (0.17) (0.05) (0.03)
N 139 47 1,379 885
Significance indicated at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗) one-sided.
Weights equal to inverse of bill’s probability of assignment to treatment.
Standard errors and p-values, clustered at bill level.
Estimated heterogeneous deliberation effects by ideology
I estimate heterogeneous effects of treatment by ideological distance with the follow-
ing regression:
Yij = a+ b1dj + b2Ideologyij + b3(d
∗
j Ideologyij) + uij (C.1)
where Yij indicates support by legislator i for bill j; dj is an indicator variable for
whether the bill was assigned to treatment; Ideologyij is the ideological distance
between legislator i and the sponsor of bill j; and uij represents unmeasured deter-
minants of turnout. Weights are again utilized to account for differential probabilities
of treatment assignment across bills.
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Table C.2 displays results among out-partisans only. Columns (1) and (3) report
results excluding the interaction between treatment and ideological distance, the
same results presented in Table 4.3. Columns (2) and (4) include the interaction
term. To evaluate whether the interaction improves model fit, Table C.2 reports an
F-test comparing the fit of the model with the interaction to the model that includes
only the base terms.
The estimands of interest are b1, the average intent-to-treat effect of assigning
an observation to treatment on support, and b3, the average intent-to-treat effect in-
teracted with ideological distance. b3 indicates whether treatment increased support
more among ideologically-similar or dissimilar legislators. b3 < 0 indicates treatment
increased support more among ideologically-proximate legislators than among dis-
similar legislators, as predicted by signaling models. I again report standard errors
and associated p-values clustered at the bill level, which are verified with random-
ization inference. Table C.2 reports the number of subjects, bill clusters, and the
effective sample size.
There is little evidence that treatment is more effective for ideologically-proximate
legislators than dissimilar legislators. The interaction term is negative for cosponsor-
ship but positive for roll call voting. Neither estimate achieves conventional levels of
statistical significance. F-statistics indicate that there is no significant improvement
in model fit by including the interaction between the treatment assignment indicator
and ideological distance.2
2Models (2) and (4) also interact the treatment indicator with an indicator for whether the
subject has a valid ideological distance, which is why reporting the F-statistic is not redundant.
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Table C.2: Estimated heterogeneous deliberation effects by ideology.
Cosponsorship Roll Call Voting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b̂1 (ITT) 4.4
∗∗ 10.4∗ 35.2∗ 13.8
(ŜE) (2.5) (8.1) (12.6) (36.3)
b̂2 (Distance) −5.7∗∗ −3.0 −76.1∗∗ −89.6∗∗
(2.7) (2.4) (17.0) (37.2)
b̂3 (Interaction) −5.4 20.2
(5.4) (40.7)
F-statistic 0.897 1.308
N 932 932 316 316
Clusters 25 25 8 8
ESS 189 189 44 44
Weights equal to inverse of bill’s probability of assignment to realized condition.
Significance indicated at p < 0.10 (∗) and p < 0.05 (∗∗) one-sided. Cluster-
robust SEs and p-values reported.
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